| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Date: Fri, 13 Jul 2012 12:11:56 -0500
From: Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>
To: Andrew Lutomirski <luto@....edu>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
qmewlo@...il.com, eparis@...hat.com, keescook@...omium.org,
james.l.morris@...cle.com, hpa@...or.com, cevans@...omium.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/vsyscall: allow seccomp filter in vsyscall=emulate
On Fri, Jul 13, 2012 at 9:32 AM, Andrew Lutomirski <luto@....edu> wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 12, 2012 at 10:17 PM, Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org> wrote:
>> If a seccomp filter program is installed, older static binaries and
>> distributions with older libc implementations (glibc 2.13 and earlier)
>> that rely on vsyscall use will be terminated regardless of the filter
>> program policy when executing time, gettimeofday, or getcpu. This is
>> only the case when vsyscall emulation is in use (vsyscall=emulate is the
>> default).
>>
>> This patch emulates system call entry inside a vsyscall=emulate trap
>> such that seccomp can properly evaluate the system call.
>>
>> Reported-by: Owen Kibel <qmewlo@...il.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
>> 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c
>> index 7515cf0..433545f 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c
>> @@ -139,6 +139,14 @@ static int addr_to_vsyscall_nr(unsigned long addr)
>> return nr;
>> }
>>
>> +static int vsyscall_seccomp(struct task_struct *tsk, int syscall_nr)
>> +{
>> + if (!seccomp_mode(&tsk->seccomp))
>> + return 0;
>> + task_pt_regs(tsk)->orig_ax = syscall_nr;
>> + return __secure_computing(syscall_nr);
>> +}
>> +
>> static bool write_ok_or_segv(unsigned long ptr, size_t size)
>> {
>> /*
>> @@ -174,6 +182,7 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
>> int vsyscall_nr;
>> int prev_sig_on_uaccess_error;
>> long ret;
>> + int skip;
>>
>> /*
>> * No point in checking CS -- the only way to get here is a user mode
>> @@ -205,9 +214,6 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
>> }
>>
>> tsk = current;
>> - if (seccomp_mode(&tsk->seccomp))
>> - do_exit(SIGKILL);
>> -
>> /*
>> * With a real vsyscall, page faults cause SIGSEGV. We want to
>> * preserve that behavior to make writing exploits harder.
>> @@ -222,8 +228,13 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
>> * address 0".
>> */
>> ret = -EFAULT;
>> + skip = 0;
>> switch (vsyscall_nr) {
>> case 0:
>> + skip = vsyscall_seccomp(tsk, __NR_gettimeofday);
>> + if (skip)
>> + break;
>> +
>> if (!write_ok_or_segv(regs->di, sizeof(struct timeval)) ||
>> !write_ok_or_segv(regs->si, sizeof(struct timezone)))
>> break;
>> @@ -234,6 +245,10 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
>> break;
>>
>> case 1:
>> + skip = vsyscall_seccomp(tsk, __NR_time);
>> + if (skip)
>> + break;
>> +
>> if (!write_ok_or_segv(regs->di, sizeof(time_t)))
>> break;
>>
>> @@ -241,6 +256,10 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
>> break;
>>
>> case 2:
>> + skip = vsyscall_seccomp(tsk, __NR_getcpu);
>> + if (skip)
>> + break;
>> +
>> if (!write_ok_or_segv(regs->di, sizeof(unsigned)) ||
>> !write_ok_or_segv(regs->si, sizeof(unsigned)))
>> break;
>> @@ -253,6 +272,9 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
>>
>> current_thread_info()->sig_on_uaccess_error = prev_sig_on_uaccess_error;
>>
>> + if (skip)
>> + goto do_ret;
>> +
>> if (ret == -EFAULT) {
>> /* Bad news -- userspace fed a bad pointer to a vsyscall. */
>> warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_INFO, regs,
>> @@ -271,6 +293,7 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
>>
>> regs->ax = ret;
>>
>> +do_ret:
>> /* Emulate a ret instruction. */
>> regs->ip = caller;
>> regs->sp += 8;
>
> Does this work correctly in SECCOMP_RET_TRAP, TRACE, or ERRNO mode?
> errno looks okay, but trap and trace still emulate the ret
> instruction, which looks like it could confuse debuggers.
You're right. The current patch behaves well, but it does leave the
ip pointing to the instruction after the glibc call $0xff... address
rather than in the vsyscall page. gdb doesn't get confused, but it
doesn't think it is a syscall -- just a signal delivered inside
time(). Thankfully, this is arch specific, so we have some clear
indicators of what is happening (errno v trap v trace). I've modified
it to behave as you suggest. v2 incoming! I've updated my some of my
tests to ensure that they recognize the vsyscall page and act
appropriately.
> (If, on the
> other hand, no change is made to the registers, then the debugger will
> see a syscall instruction at rip, albeit one that can't actually be
> executed due to the nx bit.)
Actually, that's not true! vsyscall=emulate leaves regs->ip ==
address. vsyscall=native sets it to address += 9:
vsyscall=emulate and time(0x1):
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Bad system call.
0xffffffffff600400 in ?? ()
vsyscall=native doesn't EFAULT->SIGSEGV, but if I do it with SIGSYS, you see:
Program received signal SIGSYS, Bad system call.
0xffffffffff600409 in ?? ()
and of course, the userland vdso helper with time(0x1) will show a
SIGSEGV down inside glibc:
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x00007ffff7ffba91 in time ()
That said, my goal is to not change existing "working" behavior, so
this is all just educational :)
As usual, thanks for the review and good catches!
will
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists