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Message-ID: <CALLzPKaA3MYncJD1X6B8f3p-R6FVA5-WDF-h6GGwdtinNpjqmw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Sep 2012 15:07:59 +0300
From: "Kasatkin, Dmitry" <dmitry.kasatkin@...el.com>
To: Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com,
jmorris@...ei.org, keyrings@...ux-nfs.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] module: signature infrastructure
Hi,
Please read bellow...
On Tue, Sep 4, 2012 at 8:55 AM, Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au> wrote:
> OK, I took a look at the module.c parts of David and Dmitry's patchsets,
> and didn't really like either, but I stole parts of David's to make
> this.
>
> So, here's the module.c part of module signing. I hope you two got time
> to discuss the signature format details? Mimi suggested a scheme where
> the private key would never be saved on disk (even temporarily), but I
> didn't see patches. Frankly it's something we can do later; let's aim
> at getting the format right for the next merge window.
In our patches key is stored on the disc in encrypted format...
More bellow..
>
> Cheers,
> Rusty.
>
> ---
> This patch doesn't compile: we need to implement:
>
> int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long modlen,
> const void *sig, unsigned long siglen,
> bool *sig_ok);
>
> Also, we need to actually append the signatures during build.
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
> index ad7e2e5..9b2b8d3 100644
> --- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
> @@ -1582,6 +1582,12 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
> log everything. Information is printed at KERN_DEBUG
> so loglevel=8 may also need to be specified.
>
> + module.sig_enforce
> + [KNL] When CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is set, this means that
> + modules without (valid) signatures will fail to load.
> + Note that if CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ENFORCE is set, that
> + is always true, so this option does nothing.
> +
> mousedev.tap_time=
> [MOUSE] Maximum time between finger touching and
> leaving touchpad surface for touch to be considered
> diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h
> index fbcafe2..7760c6d 100644
> --- a/include/linux/module.h
> +++ b/include/linux/module.h
> @@ -21,6 +21,9 @@
> #include <linux/percpu.h>
> #include <asm/module.h>
>
> +/* In stripped ARM and x86-64 modules, ~ is surprisingly rare. */
> +#define MODULE_SIG_STRING "~Module signature appended~\n"
> +
> /* Not Yet Implemented */
> #define MODULE_SUPPORTED_DEVICE(name)
>
> @@ -260,6 +263,11 @@ struct module
> const unsigned long *unused_gpl_crcs;
> #endif
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
> + /* Signature was verified. */
> + bool sig_ok;
> +#endif
> +
> /* symbols that will be GPL-only in the near future. */
> const struct kernel_symbol *gpl_future_syms;
> const unsigned long *gpl_future_crcs;
> diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
> index af6c7f8..7452e19 100644
> --- a/init/Kconfig
> +++ b/init/Kconfig
> @@ -1585,6 +1585,20 @@ config MODULE_SRCVERSION_ALL
> the version). With this option, such a "srcversion" field
> will be created for all modules. If unsure, say N.
>
> +config MODULE_SIG
> + bool "Module signature verification"
> + depends on MODULES
> + help
> + Check modules for valid signatures upon load: the signature
> + is simply appended to the module. For more information see
> + Documentation/module-signing.txt.
> +
> +config MODULE_SIG_FORCE
> + bool "Require modules to be validly signed"
> + depends on MODULE_SIG
> + help
> + Reject unsigned modules or signed modules for which we don't have a
> + key. Without this, such modules will simply taint the kernel.
> endif # MODULES
>
> config INIT_ALL_POSSIBLE
> diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
> index 4edbd9c..3cbd1a4 100644
> --- a/kernel/module.c
> +++ b/kernel/module.c
> @@ -102,6 +102,43 @@ static LIST_HEAD(modules);
> struct list_head *kdb_modules = &modules; /* kdb needs the list of modules */
> #endif /* CONFIG_KGDB_KDB */
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ENFORCE
> +static bool sig_enforce = true;
> +#else
> +static bool sig_enforce = false;
> +
> +static int param_set_bool_enable_only(const char *val,
> + const struct kernel_param *kp)
> +{
> + int err;
> + bool test;
> + struct kernel_param dummy_kp = *kp;
> +
> + dummy_kp.arg = &test;
> +
> + err = param_set_bool(val, &dummy_kp);
> + if (err)
> + return err;
> +
> + /* Don't let them unset it once it's set! */
> + if (!test && sig_enforce)
> + return -EROFS;
> +
> + if (test)
> + sig_enforce = true;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_bool_enable_only = {
> + .set = param_set_bool_enable_only,
> + .get = param_get_bool,
> +};
> +#define param_check_bool_enable_only param_check_bool
> +
> +module_param(sig_enforce, bool_enable_only, 0644);
> +#endif /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ENFORCE */
> +#endif /* CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */
>
> /* Block module loading/unloading? */
> int modules_disabled = 0;
> @@ -136,6 +173,7 @@ struct load_info {
> unsigned long symoffs, stroffs;
> struct _ddebug *debug;
> unsigned int num_debug;
> + bool sig_ok;
> struct {
> unsigned int sym, str, mod, vers, info, pcpu;
> } index;
> @@ -2399,7 +2437,50 @@ static inline void kmemleak_load_module(const struct module *mod,
> }
> #endif
>
> -/* Sets info->hdr and info->len. */
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
> +static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info,
> + void *mod, unsigned long *len)
> +{
> + int err;
> + unsigned long i, siglen;
> + char *sig = NULL;
> +
> + /* This is not a valid module: ELF header is larger anyway. */
> + if (*len < sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING))
> + return -ENOEXEC;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < *len - (sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING)-1); i++) {
> + /* Our memcmp is dumb, speed it up a little. */
> + if (((char *)mod)[i] != MODULE_SIG_STRING[0])
> + continue;
> + if (memcmp(mod, MODULE_SIG_STRING, strlen(MODULE_SIG_STRING)))
should be (mod+i)?
> + continue;
> +
> + sig = mod + i + strlen(MODULE_SIG_STRING);
> + siglen = *len - i - strlen(MODULE_SIG_STRING);
> + *len = i;
> + break;
> + }
In general please clarify why do you need such parsing at all?
Why not to have MODULE_SIG_STRING as a last octets of the module and
have signature length field before?
Then it is easy to get the signature and rest of the module?
That will be super fast...
Please clarify.
> +
> + if (!sig)
> + err = 0;
> + else
> + err = mod_verify_sig(mod, len, sig, siglen, &info->sig_ok);
> +
> + /* Not having a signature is only an error if we're strict. */
> + if (!err && !info->sig_ok && sig_enforce)
> + err = -EKEYREJECTED;
> + return err;
> +}
> +#else /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */
> +static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info,
> + void *mod, unsigned long *len)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +#endif /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */
> +
> +/* Sets info->hdr, info->len and info->sig_ok. */
> static int copy_and_check(struct load_info *info,
> const void __user *umod, unsigned long len,
> const char __user *uargs)
> @@ -2419,6 +2500,10 @@ static int copy_and_check(struct load_info *info,
> goto free_hdr;
> }
>
> + err = module_sig_check(info, hdr, &len);
> + if (err)
> + goto free_hdr;
> +
> /* Sanity checks against insmoding binaries or wrong arch,
> weird elf version */
> if (memcmp(hdr->e_ident, ELFMAG, SELFMAG) != 0
> @@ -2886,6 +2971,12 @@ static struct module *load_module(void __user *umod,
> goto free_copy;
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
> + mod->sig_ok = info.sig_ok;
> + if (!mod->sig_ok)
> + add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_FORCED_MODULE);
> +#endif
> +
> /* Now module is in final location, initialize linked lists, etc. */
> err = module_unload_init(mod);
> if (err)
--
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