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Message-ID: <CALLzPKYO7KyiZpC4uUy+4VueLiVM0YqphtAVBhRd1VW_AryyQw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Sep 2012 15:21:20 +0300
From: "Kasatkin, Dmitry" <dmitry.kasatkin@...el.com>
To: Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com,
jmorris@...ei.org, keyrings@...ux-nfs.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] module: signature infrastructure
On Tue, Sep 4, 2012 at 3:07 PM, Kasatkin, Dmitry
<dmitry.kasatkin@...el.com> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Please read bellow...
>
> On Tue, Sep 4, 2012 at 8:55 AM, Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au> wrote:
>> OK, I took a look at the module.c parts of David and Dmitry's patchsets,
>> and didn't really like either, but I stole parts of David's to make
>> this.
>>
>> So, here's the module.c part of module signing. I hope you two got time
>> to discuss the signature format details? Mimi suggested a scheme where
>> the private key would never be saved on disk (even temporarily), but I
>> didn't see patches. Frankly it's something we can do later; let's aim
>> at getting the format right for the next merge window.
>
> In our patches key is stored on the disc in encrypted format...
>
> More bellow..
>
>>
>> Cheers,
>> Rusty.
>>
>> ---
>> This patch doesn't compile: we need to implement:
>>
>> int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long modlen,
>> const void *sig, unsigned long siglen,
>> bool *sig_ok);
>>
>> Also, we need to actually append the signatures during build.
>>
>> diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
>> index ad7e2e5..9b2b8d3 100644
>> --- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
>> +++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
>> @@ -1582,6 +1582,12 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
>> log everything. Information is printed at KERN_DEBUG
>> so loglevel=8 may also need to be specified.
>>
>> + module.sig_enforce
>> + [KNL] When CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is set, this means that
>> + modules without (valid) signatures will fail to load.
>> + Note that if CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ENFORCE is set, that
>> + is always true, so this option does nothing.
>> +
>> mousedev.tap_time=
>> [MOUSE] Maximum time between finger touching and
>> leaving touchpad surface for touch to be considered
>> diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h
>> index fbcafe2..7760c6d 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/module.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/module.h
>> @@ -21,6 +21,9 @@
>> #include <linux/percpu.h>
>> #include <asm/module.h>
>>
>> +/* In stripped ARM and x86-64 modules, ~ is surprisingly rare. */
>> +#define MODULE_SIG_STRING "~Module signature appended~\n"
>> +
>> /* Not Yet Implemented */
>> #define MODULE_SUPPORTED_DEVICE(name)
>>
>> @@ -260,6 +263,11 @@ struct module
>> const unsigned long *unused_gpl_crcs;
>> #endif
>>
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
>> + /* Signature was verified. */
>> + bool sig_ok;
>> +#endif
>> +
>> /* symbols that will be GPL-only in the near future. */
>> const struct kernel_symbol *gpl_future_syms;
>> const unsigned long *gpl_future_crcs;
>> diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
>> index af6c7f8..7452e19 100644
>> --- a/init/Kconfig
>> +++ b/init/Kconfig
>> @@ -1585,6 +1585,20 @@ config MODULE_SRCVERSION_ALL
>> the version). With this option, such a "srcversion" field
>> will be created for all modules. If unsure, say N.
>>
>> +config MODULE_SIG
>> + bool "Module signature verification"
>> + depends on MODULES
>> + help
>> + Check modules for valid signatures upon load: the signature
>> + is simply appended to the module. For more information see
>> + Documentation/module-signing.txt.
>> +
>> +config MODULE_SIG_FORCE
>> + bool "Require modules to be validly signed"
>> + depends on MODULE_SIG
>> + help
>> + Reject unsigned modules or signed modules for which we don't have a
>> + key. Without this, such modules will simply taint the kernel.
>> endif # MODULES
>>
>> config INIT_ALL_POSSIBLE
>> diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
>> index 4edbd9c..3cbd1a4 100644
>> --- a/kernel/module.c
>> +++ b/kernel/module.c
>> @@ -102,6 +102,43 @@ static LIST_HEAD(modules);
>> struct list_head *kdb_modules = &modules; /* kdb needs the list of modules */
>> #endif /* CONFIG_KGDB_KDB */
>>
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ENFORCE
>> +static bool sig_enforce = true;
>> +#else
>> +static bool sig_enforce = false;
>> +
>> +static int param_set_bool_enable_only(const char *val,
>> + const struct kernel_param *kp)
>> +{
>> + int err;
>> + bool test;
>> + struct kernel_param dummy_kp = *kp;
>> +
>> + dummy_kp.arg = &test;
>> +
>> + err = param_set_bool(val, &dummy_kp);
>> + if (err)
>> + return err;
>> +
>> + /* Don't let them unset it once it's set! */
>> + if (!test && sig_enforce)
>> + return -EROFS;
>> +
>> + if (test)
>> + sig_enforce = true;
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_bool_enable_only = {
>> + .set = param_set_bool_enable_only,
>> + .get = param_get_bool,
>> +};
>> +#define param_check_bool_enable_only param_check_bool
>> +
>> +module_param(sig_enforce, bool_enable_only, 0644);
>> +#endif /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ENFORCE */
>> +#endif /* CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */
>>
>> /* Block module loading/unloading? */
>> int modules_disabled = 0;
>> @@ -136,6 +173,7 @@ struct load_info {
>> unsigned long symoffs, stroffs;
>> struct _ddebug *debug;
>> unsigned int num_debug;
>> + bool sig_ok;
>> struct {
>> unsigned int sym, str, mod, vers, info, pcpu;
>> } index;
>> @@ -2399,7 +2437,50 @@ static inline void kmemleak_load_module(const struct module *mod,
>> }
>> #endif
>>
>> -/* Sets info->hdr and info->len. */
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
>> +static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info,
>> + void *mod, unsigned long *len)
>> +{
>> + int err;
>> + unsigned long i, siglen;
>> + char *sig = NULL;
>> +
>> + /* This is not a valid module: ELF header is larger anyway. */
>> + if (*len < sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING))
>> + return -ENOEXEC;
>> +
>> + for (i = 0; i < *len - (sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING)-1); i++) {
>> + /* Our memcmp is dumb, speed it up a little. */
>> + if (((char *)mod)[i] != MODULE_SIG_STRING[0])
>> + continue;
>> + if (memcmp(mod, MODULE_SIG_STRING, strlen(MODULE_SIG_STRING)))
>
> should be (mod+i)?
>
>> + continue;
>> +
>> + sig = mod + i + strlen(MODULE_SIG_STRING);
>> + siglen = *len - i - strlen(MODULE_SIG_STRING);
>> + *len = i;
>> + break;
>> + }
>
> In general please clarify why do you need such parsing at all?
> Why not to have MODULE_SIG_STRING as a last octets of the module and
> have signature length field before?
> Then it is easy to get the signature and rest of the module?
> That will be super fast...
>
This is how it looks
http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/kasatkin/linux-digsig.git;a=blob;f=security/integrity/module.c;h=b111bb400a248ab9b03a64ea373c88396f311649;hb=19eef6e4e529ccf2b3a6ab5c19dd40f2eaf8fcaf
> Please clarify.
>
>> +
>> + if (!sig)
>> + err = 0;
>> + else
>> + err = mod_verify_sig(mod, len, sig, siglen, &info->sig_ok);
>> +
>> + /* Not having a signature is only an error if we're strict. */
>> + if (!err && !info->sig_ok && sig_enforce)
>> + err = -EKEYREJECTED;
>> + return err;
>> +}
>> +#else /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */
>> +static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info,
>> + void *mod, unsigned long *len)
>> +{
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +#endif /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */
>> +
>> +/* Sets info->hdr, info->len and info->sig_ok. */
>> static int copy_and_check(struct load_info *info,
>> const void __user *umod, unsigned long len,
>> const char __user *uargs)
>> @@ -2419,6 +2500,10 @@ static int copy_and_check(struct load_info *info,
>> goto free_hdr;
>> }
>>
>> + err = module_sig_check(info, hdr, &len);
>> + if (err)
>> + goto free_hdr;
>> +
>> /* Sanity checks against insmoding binaries or wrong arch,
>> weird elf version */
>> if (memcmp(hdr->e_ident, ELFMAG, SELFMAG) != 0
>> @@ -2886,6 +2971,12 @@ static struct module *load_module(void __user *umod,
>> goto free_copy;
>> }
>>
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
>> + mod->sig_ok = info.sig_ok;
>> + if (!mod->sig_ok)
>> + add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_FORCED_MODULE);
>> +#endif
>> +
>> /* Now module is in final location, initialize linked lists, etc. */
>> err = module_unload_init(mod);
>> if (err)
--
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