linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 07/11] kexec: Disable in a secure boot environment

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Message-ID: <20120905051652.GA5133@srcf.ucam.org>
Date:	Wed, 5 Sep 2012 06:16:52 +0100
From:	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>
To:	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 07/11] kexec: Disable in a secure boot environment

On Tue, Sep 04, 2012 at 09:33:31PM -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org> writes:
> > The full implementation should trust keys that are trusted by the 
> > platform, so it'd boot any kexec image you cared to sign. Or simply 
> > patch this code out and rebuild and self-sign, or disable the code that 
> > turns off the capability when in secure boot mode. I've no objection to 
> > putting that behind an #ifdef.
> 
> I will be happy to see a version of kexec that accepts signed images,
> allowing the functionality to work in your brave new world where
> everything must be signed.
> 
> Until then I don't see a point in merging anything else.

Fine. We'll just carry this one out of tree for now.
-- 
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@...f.ucam.org
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