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Message-ID: <871uihnecw.fsf@xmission.com>
Date: Wed, 05 Sep 2012 00:00:31 -0700
From: ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 07/11] kexec: Disable in a secure boot environment
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org> writes:
> On Tue, Sep 04, 2012 at 09:33:31PM -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org> writes:
>> > The full implementation should trust keys that are trusted by the
>> > platform, so it'd boot any kexec image you cared to sign. Or simply
>> > patch this code out and rebuild and self-sign, or disable the code that
>> > turns off the capability when in secure boot mode. I've no objection to
>> > putting that behind an #ifdef.
>>
>> I will be happy to see a version of kexec that accepts signed images,
>> allowing the functionality to work in your brave new world where
>> everything must be signed.
>>
>> Until then I don't see a point in merging anything else.
>
> Fine. We'll just carry this one out of tree for now.
It is your tree.
I am disappointed to learn that you aren't enthusiastic about
implementing verification of signatures for all code that goes into
ring 0.
Eric
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