linux-kernel - Re: [RESEND][PATCH] gen_init_cpio: avoid stack overflow when expanding

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-Id: <20121024145655.7db21d20.akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Date:	Wed, 24 Oct 2012 14:56:55 -0700
From:	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
To:	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Michal Marek <mmarek@...e.cz>,
	Brad Spengler <spender@...ecurity.net>,
	PaX Team <pageexec@...email.hu>
Subject: Re: [RESEND][PATCH] gen_init_cpio: avoid stack overflow when
 expanding

On Wed, 24 Oct 2012 14:53:33 -0700
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:

> > Well, I do think that a description of the user impact of the bug
> > should be included in the changelog so that poor old Greg can work out
> > why we sent it at him.
> >
> > If you can suggest some suitable text I can copy-n-slurp that into the
> > changelog.
> 
> How about replacing the first paragraph with:
> 
> Fix possible overflow of the buffer used for expanding environment
> variables when building file list. In the extremely unlikely case of
> an attacker having control over the environment variables visible to
> gen_init_cpio, control over the contents of the file gen_init_cpio
> parses, and gen_init_cpio was built without compiler hardening, the
> attacker can gain arbitrary execution control via a stack buffer
> overflow.

ooh, spiffy - even I understood that!
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/