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Message-ID: <5093FADA.2040004@genband.com>
Date: Fri, 02 Nov 2012 10:54:50 -0600
From: Chris Friesen <chris.friesen@...band.com>
To: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>
CC: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>, Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>, Oliver Neukum <oneukum@...e.de>,
Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...il.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support
On 11/02/2012 09:48 AM, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 01, 2012 at 03:02:25PM -0600, Chris Friesen wrote:
>> With secure boot enabled, then the kernel should refuse to let an
>> unsigned kexec load new images, and kexec itself should refuse to
>> load unsigned images.
>
> Yep, good in theory. Now that basically means reimplementing kexec-tools
> in kernel.
Maybe I'm missing something, but couldn't the vendors provide a signed
kexec? Why does extra stuff need to be pushed into the kernel?
Chris
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