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Message-ID: <1351879058.2439.46.camel@dabdike.int.hansenpartnership.com>
Date: Fri, 02 Nov 2012 17:57:38 +0000
From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
Chris Friesen <chris.friesen@...band.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>, Oliver Neukum <oneukum@...e.de>,
Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...il.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support
On Fri, 2012-11-02 at 17:54 +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 02, 2012 at 05:48:31PM +0000, James Bottomley wrote:
> > On Fri, 2012-11-02 at 16:54 +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > > On Fri, Nov 02, 2012 at 04:52:44PM +0000, James Bottomley wrote:
> > >
> > > > The first question is how many compromises do you need. Without
> > > > co-operation from windows, you don't get to install something in the
> > > > boot system, so if you're looking for a single compromise vector, the
> > > > only realistic attack is to trick the user into booting a hacked linux
> > > > system from USB or DVD.
> > >
> > > You run a binary. It pops up a box saying "Windows needs your permission
> > > to continue", just like almost every other Windows binary that's any
> > > use. Done.
> >
> > And if all the loaders do some type of present user test on a virgin
> > system, how do you propose to get that message up there?
>
> ? That's the message generated by the Windows access control mechanism
> when you run a binary that requests elevated privileges.
So that's a windows attack vector using a windows binary? I can't really
see how it's relevant to the secure boot discussion then.
James
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