[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20121102180458.GA12052@srcf.ucam.org>
Date: Fri, 2 Nov 2012 18:04:58 +0000
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>
To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
Chris Friesen <chris.friesen@...band.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>, Oliver Neukum <oneukum@...e.de>,
Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...il.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support
On Fri, Nov 02, 2012 at 05:57:38PM +0000, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Fri, 2012-11-02 at 17:54 +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > ? That's the message generated by the Windows access control mechanism
> > when you run a binary that requests elevated privileges.
>
> So that's a windows attack vector using a windows binary? I can't really
> see how it's relevant to the secure boot discussion then.
A user runs a binary that elevates itself to admin. Absent any flaws in
Windows (cough), that should be all it can do in a Secure Boot world.
But if you can drop a small trusted Linux system in there and use that
to boot a compromised Windows kernel, it can make itself persistent.
--
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@...f.ucam.org
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists