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Message-ID: <alpine.LNX.2.00.1211040008280.24253@pobox.suse.cz>
Date: Sun, 4 Nov 2012 00:09:55 +0100 (CET)
From: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>
To: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>
Cc: Chris Friesen <chris.friesen@...band.com>,
Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
Oliver Neukum <oneukum@...e.de>,
Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...il.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support
On Fri, 2 Nov 2012, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > With secure boot enabled, then the kernel should refuse to let an
> > unsigned kexec load new images, and kexec itself should refuse to
> > load unsigned images.
>
> Yep, good in theory. Now that basically means reimplementing kexec-tools
> in kernel.
Why is "when kernel has been securely booted, the in-kernel kexec
mechanism has to verify the signature of the supplied image before
kexecing it" not enough? (basically the same thing we are doing for signed
modules already).
--
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs
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