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Message-ID: <20121104042802.GA11295@srcf.ucam.org>
Date: Sun, 4 Nov 2012 04:28:02 +0000
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>
To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
Chris Friesen <chris.friesen@...band.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>, Oliver Neukum <oneukum@...e.de>,
Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...il.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support
On Sat, Nov 03, 2012 at 10:56:40PM +0000, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Sat, 2012-11-03 at 13:46 +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > I... what? Our signed bootloader will boot our signed kernel without any
> > physically present end-user involvement. We therefore need to make it
> > as difficult as practically possible for an attacker to use our signed
> > bootloader and our signed kernel as an attack vector against other
> > operating systems, which includes worrying about hibernate and kexec. If
> > people want to support this use case then patches to deal with that need
> > to be present in the upstream kernel.
>
> Right, but what I'm telling you is that by deciding to allow automatic
> first boot, you're causing the windows attack vector problem. You could
> easily do a present user test only on first boot which would eliminate
> it. Instead, we get all of this.
Your definition of "Best practices" is "Automated installs are
impossible"? Have you ever actually spoken to a user?
--
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@...f.ucam.org
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