linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 2/3] binfmt_elf: Verify signature of signed elf binary

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Message-ID: <50FC22AA.9040609@zytor.com>
Date:	Sun, 20 Jan 2013 09:00:26 -0800
From:	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
To:	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
CC:	Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	ebiederm@...ssion.com, pjones@...hat.com, dhowells@...hat.com,
	jwboyer@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] binfmt_elf: Verify signature of signed elf binary

On 01/20/2013 08:55 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Sun, 2013-01-20 at 08:17 -0800, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
>> You then get into issues like: do we have to ban prelink as a result?
> 
> Once you change a file, the original signature shouldn't match.  If you
> really trust prelink, then make prelink a trusted application that can
> resign the modified file.  How to create/store/use private keys on the
> target system is a separate issue.
> 

That is true in a particularly brittle sense of the word, but it would
also be possible for the signature system to explicitly recognize the
transformation performed by prelink -- and no other -- before
verification.  That being said, that may be quite complex.

	-hpa


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