linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 0/2] Secure Boot: More controversial changes

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Date:	Mon, 28 Jan 2013 18:05:56 -0800
From:	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
To:	Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>
CC:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] Secure Boot: More controversial changes

On 01/28/2013 08:47 AM, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> These patches break functionality that people rely on without providing
> any functional equivalent, so I'm not suggesting that they be merged
> as-is. kexec allows trivial circumvention of the trust model (it's
> trivially equivalent to permitting module loading, for instance) and
> hibernation allows similar attacks (disable swap, write a pre-formed resume
> image to swap, reboot). The hibernation patch also shows up a different
> issue - some userspace drops all capabilities, resulting in things that
> userspace expects to work no longer working. This seems like an
> unsurprising result, but breaking userspace is bad and so it'd be nice to
> figure out if there's another way to handle this.

These at the very least need some kind of CONFIG_WEAK_SECURE_BOOT option 
or something like that.

	-hpa

-- 
H. Peter Anvin, Intel Open Source Technology Center
I work for Intel.  I don't speak on their behalf.

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