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Message-ID: <14690.1359541976@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Date: Wed, 30 Jan 2013 10:32:56 +0000
From: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To: "Kasatkin, Dmitry" <dmitry.kasatkin@...el.com>
Cc: dhowells@...hat.com, zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...ux-nfs.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] KEYS: Add a 'trusted' flag and a 'trusted only' flag
Kasatkin, Dmitry <dmitry.kasatkin@...el.com> wrote:
> What about the case when running from integrity protected initramfs?
> Either embedded into the signed kernel, or verified by the boot loader.
> In such case it is possible to assume that all keys which are added by
> user space are implicitly trusted.
> Later on, before continuing booting normal rootfs, set the key
> subsystem state (trust-lock),
> so that trusted keyrings accept only explicitly trusted keys...
>
> Does it make sense?
I'm not sure it does. Initramfs is (re-)fabricated on the machine on which it
runs any time you update one of a set of rpms (such as the kernel rpm) because
it has machine-specific data and drivers in it.
David
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