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Message-ID: <CAKgNAki=mUYuu_Ewhe7sjCmo+Dq2Vr+FZCixqNRaadcvAxtpFw@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Thu, 28 Feb 2013 12:24:07 +0100
From:	"Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@...il.com>
To:	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Cc:	Linux Containers <containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
	lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	linux-man <linux-man@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: For review: pid_namespaces(7) man page

Eric et al,

Eventually, there will be more namespace man pages, but let us start
now with one for PID namespaces. The attached page aims to provide a
fairly complete overview of PID namespaces.

Eric, various pieces of the page are shifted out of other pages
(clone(2), setns(2), etc.) and are derived from comments you've
emailed me off list, so you are (jointly) in the copyright of the
page. I've chosen the common license for man-pages; let me know if you
have any objections to that license.

I'm looking for review comments (corrections, improvements, additions,
etc.) on this page. I've provided it in two forms inline below, and
reviewers can comment comment on whichever form they are most
comfortable with:

1) The rendered page as plain text
2) The *roff source (also attached); rendering that source will enable
readers to see proper formatting for the page.

Note that the namespaces(7) page referred to in this page is not yet
finished; I'll send it out for review at a future time.

Thanks,

Michael

==========
PID_NAMESPACES(7)      Linux Programmer's Manual     PID_NAMESPACES(7)

NAME
       pid_namespaces - overview of Linux PID namespaces

DESCRIPTION
       For an overview of namespaces, see namespaces(7).

       PID  namespaces  isolate  the  process ID number space, meaning
       that processes in different PID namespaces can  have  the  same
       PID.   PID namespaces allow containers to migrate to a new host
       while the processes inside  the  container  maintain  the  same
       PIDs.

       PIDs  in a new PID namespace start at 1, somewhat like a stand‐
       alone system, and calls to fork(2), vfork(2), or clone(2)  will
       produce  processes  with PIDs that are unique within the names‐
       pace.

       Use of PID namespaces requires a kernel that is configured with
       the CONFIG_PID_NS option.

   The namespace init process
       The first process created in a new namespace (i.e., the process
       created using clone(2) with the CLONE_NEWPID flag, or the first
       child created by a process after a call to unshare(2) using the
       CLONE_NEWPID flag) has the PID 1, and is the "init" process for
       the namespace (see init(1)).  Children that are orphaned within
       the namespace will be reparented to this  process  rather  than
       init(1).

       If the "init" process of a PID namespace terminates, the kernel
       terminates all of the processes in the namespace via a  SIGKILL
       signal.   This  behavior  reflects  the  fact  that  the "init"
       process is essential for the correct operation of a PID  names‐
       pace.   In this case, a subsequent fork(2) into this PID names‐
       pace (e.g., from a process that has done a  setns(2)  into  the
       namespace    using    an    open    file   descriptor   for   a
       /proc/[pid]/ns/pid file corresponding to a process that was  in
       the  namespace) will fail with the error ENOMEM; it is not pos‐
       sible to create a new processes in a PID namespace whose "init"
       process has terminated.

       Only  signals  for  which  the "init" process has established a
       signal handler can be sent to the "init" process by other  mem‐
       bers  of  the  PID namespace.  This restriction applies even to
       privileged processes, and prevents other  members  of  the  PID
       namespace from accidentally killing the "init" process.

       Likewise, a process in an ancestor namespace can—subject to the
       usual permission checks described in  kill(2)—send  signals  to
       the  "init" process of a child PID namespace only if the "init"
       process has established a handler for that signal.  (Within the
       handler,  the  siginfo_t si_pid field described in sigaction(2)
       will be zero.)  SIGKILL or SIGSTOP are  treated  exceptionally:
       these signals are forcibly delivered when sent from an ancestor
       PID namespace.  Neither of these signals can be caught  by  the
       "init" process, and so will result in the usual actions associ‐
       ated with those signals (respectively, terminating and stopping
       the process).

   Nesting PID namespaces
       PID  namespaces can be nested: each PID namespace has a parent,
       except for the initial ("root") PID namespace.  The parent of a
       PID  namespace is the PID namespace of the process that created
       the namespace using clone(2)  or  unshare(2).   PID  namespaces
       thus  form a tree, with all namespaces ultimately tracing their
       ancestry to the root namespace.

       A process is visible to other processes in its  PID  namespace,
       and  to  the  processes  in  each direct ancestor PID namespace
       going back to the root PID namespace.  In this context,  "visi‐
       ble"  means that one process can be the target of operations by
       another process using system calls that specify a  process  ID.
       Conversely,  the  processes  in a child PID namespace can't see
       processes in the parent and further removed ancestor namespace.
       More  succinctly:  a  process  can see (e.g., send signals with
       kill(2), set nice values with setpriority(2), etc.)  only  pro‐
       cesses contained in its own PID namespace and in descendants of
       that namespace.

       A process has one process ID in each of the layers of  the  PID
       namespace  hierarchy  in  which  is  visible,  and walking back
       though each direct ancestor namespace through to the  root  PID
       namespace.   System  calls  that  operate on process IDs always
       operate using the process ID that is visible in the PID  names‐
       pace of the caller.  A call to getpid(2) always returns the PID
       associated with the namespace in which the process was created.

       Some processes in a PID namespace may  have  parents  that  are
       outside  of the namespace.  For example, the parent of the ini‐
       tial process in the namespace (i.e., the init(1)  process  with
       PID  1)  is  necessarily  in  another namespace.  Likewise, the
       direct children of a process that uses setns(2)  to  cause  its
       children  to join a PID namespace are in a different PID names‐
       pace from the caller of setns(2).  Calls to getppid(2) for such
       processes return 0.

   setns(2) and unshare(2) semantics
       Calls  to setns(2) that specify a PID namespace file descriptor
       and calls to unshare(2) with the CLONE_NEWPID flag cause  chil‐
       dren  subsequently created by the caller to be placed in a dif‐
       ferent PID namespace from the caller.  These calls do not, how‐
       ever,  change the PID namespace of the calling process, because
       doing so would change the caller's idea  of  its  own  PID  (as
       reported  by getpid()), which would break many applications and
       libraries.

       To put things another way: a process's PID namespace membership
       is determined when the process is created and cannot be changed
       thereafter.  Among other things, this means that  the  parental
       relationship between processes mirrors the parental between PID
       namespaces: the parent of a  process  is  either  in  the  same
       namespace or resides in the immediate parent PID namespace.

       Every  thread  in  a process must be in the same PID namespace.
       For this reason, the two following call sequences will fail:

           unshare(CLONE_NEWPID);
           clone(..., CLONE_VM, ...);    /* Fails */

           setns(fd, CLONE_NEWPID);
           clone(..., CLONE_VM, ...);    /* Fails */

       Because the above unshare(2) and setns(2) calls only change the
       PID  namespace  for created children, the clone(2) calls neces‐
       sarily put the new thread in a different PID namespace from the
       calling thread.

   Miscellaneous
       After  creating a new PID namespace, it is useful for the child
       to change its root directory and mount a new procfs instance at
       /proc  so  that  tools such as ps(1) work correctly.  (If a new
       mount  namespace  is  simultaneously   created   by   including
       CLONE_NEWNS  in  the flags argument of clone(2) or unshare(2)),
       then it isn't necessary to change the  root  directory:  a  new
       procfs instance can be mounted directly over /proc.)

       Calling  readlink(2)  on the path /proc/self yields the process
       ID of the caller in the  PID  namespace  of  the  procfs  mount
       (i.e.,  the  PID  namespace  of  the  process  that mounted the
       procfs).

       When a process ID is passed over a  UNIX  domain  socket  to  a
       process  in  a  different PID namespace (see the description of
       SCM_CREDENTIALS in unix(7)), it is translated into  the  corre‐
       sponding PID value in the receiving process's PID namespace.

CONFORMING TO
       Namespaces are a Linux-specific feature.

SEE ALSO
       unshare(1),  clone(2),  setns(2),  unshare(2), proc(5), creden‐
       tials(7), capabilities(7), user_namespaces(7), switch_root(8)



Linux                         2013-01-14             PID_NAMESPACES(7)


=========== *roff source ==========

$ cat pid_namespaces.7
.\" Copyright (c) 2013 by Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>
.\" and Copyright (c) 2012 by Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
.\"
.\" Permission is granted to make and distribute verbatim copies of this
.\" manual provided the copyright notice and this permission notice are
.\" preserved on all copies.
.\"
.\" Permission is granted to copy and distribute modified versions of this
.\" manual under the conditions for verbatim copying, provided that the
.\" entire resulting derived work is distributed under the terms of a
.\" permission notice identical to this one.
.\"
.\" Since the Linux kernel and libraries are constantly changing, this
.\" manual page may be incorrect or out-of-date.  The author(s) assume no
.\" responsibility for errors or omissions, or for damages resulting from
.\" the use of the information contained herein.  The author(s) may not
.\" have taken the same level of care in the production of this manual,
.\" which is licensed free of charge, as they might when working
.\" professionally.
.\"
.\" Formatted or processed versions of this manual, if unaccompanied by
.\" the source, must acknowledge the copyright and authors of this work.
.\"
.\"
.TH PID_NAMESPACES 7 2013-01-14 "Linux" "Linux Programmer's Manual"
.SH NAME
pid_namespaces \- overview of Linux PID namespaces
.SH DESCRIPTION
For an overview of namespaces, see
.BR namespaces (7).

PID namespaces isolate the process ID number space,
meaning that processes in different PID namespaces can have the same PID.
PID namespaces allow containers to migrate to a new host
while the processes inside the container maintain the same PIDs.

PIDs in a new PID namespace start at 1,
somewhat like a standalone system, and calls to
.BR fork (2),
.BR vfork (2),
or
.BR clone (2)
will produce processes with PIDs that are unique within the namespace.

Use of PID namespaces requires a kernel that is configured with the
.B CONFIG_PID_NS
option.
.\"
.\" ============================================================
.\"
.SS The namespace "init" process
The first process created in a new namespace
(i.e., the process created using
.BR clone (2)
with the
.BR CLONE_NEWPID
flag, or the first child created by a process after a call to
.BR unshare (2)
using the
.BR CLONE_NEWPID
flag) has the PID 1, and is the "init" process for the namespace (see
.BR init (1)).
Children that are orphaned within the namespace will be reparented
to this process rather than
.BR init (1).

If the "init" process of a PID namespace terminates,
the kernel terminates all of the processes in the namespace via a
.BR SIGKILL
signal.
This behavior reflects the fact that the "init" process
is essential for the correct operation of a PID namespace.
In this case, a subsequent
.BR fork (2)
into this PID namespace (e.g., from a process that has done a
.BR setns (2)
into the namespace using an open file descriptor for a
.I /proc/[pid]/ns/pid
file corresponding to a process that was in the namespace)
will fail with the error
.BR ENOMEM ;
it is not possible to create a new processes in a PID namespace whose "init"
process has terminated.

Only signals for which the "init" process has established a signal handler
can be sent to the "init" process by other members of the PID namespace.
This restriction applies even to privileged processes,
and prevents other members of the PID namespace from
accidentally killing the "init" process.

Likewise, a process in an ancestor namespace
can\(emsubject to the usual permission checks described in
.BR kill (2)\(emsend
signals to the "init" process of a child PID namespace only
if the "init" process has established a handler for that signal.
(Within the handler, the
.I siginfo_t
.I si_pid
field described in
.BR sigaction (2)
will be zero.)
.B SIGKILL
or
.B SIGSTOP
are treated exceptionally:
these signals are forcibly delivered when sent from an ancestor PID namespace.
Neither of these signals can be caught by the "init" process,
and so will result in the usual actions associated with those signals
(respectively, terminating and stopping the process).
.\"
.\" ============================================================
.\"
.SS Nesting PID namespaces
PID namespaces can be nested:
each PID namespace has a parent,
except for the initial ("root") PID namespace.
The parent of a PID namespace is the PID namespace of the process that
created the namespace using
.BR clone (2)
or
.BR unshare (2).
PID namespaces thus form a tree,
with all namespaces ultimately tracing their ancestry to the root namespace.

A process is visible to other processes in its PID namespace,
and to the processes in each direct ancestor PID namespace
going back to the root PID namespace.
In this context, "visible" means that one process
can be the target of operations by another process using
system calls that specify a process ID.
Conversely, the processes in a child PID namespace can't see
processes in the parent and further removed ancestor namespace.
More succinctly: a process can see (e.g., send signals with
.BR kill(2),
set nice values with
.BR setpriority (2),
etc.) only processes contained in its own PID namespace
and in descendants of that namespace.

A process has one process ID in each of the layers of the PID
namespace hierarchy in which is visible,
and walking back though each direct ancestor namespace
through to the root PID namespace.
System calls that operate on process IDs always
operate using the process ID that is visible in the
PID namespace of the caller.
A call to
.BR getpid (2)
always returns the PID associated with the namespace in which
the process was created.

Some processes in a PID namespace may have parents
that are outside of the namespace.
For example, the parent of the initial process in the namespace
(i.e., the
.BR init (1)
process with PID 1) is necessarily in another namespace.
Likewise, the direct children of a process that uses
.BR setns (2)
to cause its children to join a PID namespace are in a different
PID namespace from the caller of
.BR setns (2).
Calls to
.BR getppid (2)
for such processes return 0.
.\"
.\" ============================================================
.\"
.SS setns(2) and unshare(2) semantics
Calls to
.BR setns (2)
that specify a PID namespace file descriptor
and calls to
.BR unshare (2)
with the
.BR CLONE_NEWPID
flag cause children subsequently created
by the caller to be placed in a different PID namespace from the caller.
These calls do not, however,
change the PID namespace of the calling process,
because doing so would change the caller's idea of its own PID
(as reported by
.BR getpid ()),
which would break many applications and libraries.

To put things another way:
a process's PID namespace membership is determined when the process is created
and cannot be changed thereafter.
Among other things, this means that the parental relationship
between processes mirrors the parental between PID namespaces:
the parent of a process is either in the same namespace
or resides in the immediate parent PID namespace.

Every thread in a process must be in the same PID namespace.
For this reason, the two following call sequences will fail:

.nf
    unshare(CLONE_NEWPID);
    clone(..., CLONE_VM, ...);    /* Fails */

    setns(fd, CLONE_NEWPID);
    clone(..., CLONE_VM, ...);    /* Fails */
.fi

Because the above
.BR unshare (2)
and
.BR setns (2)
calls only change the PID namespace for created children, the
.BR clone (2)
calls necessarily put the new thread in a different PID namespace from
the calling thread.
.\"
.\" ============================================================
.\"
.SS Miscellaneous
After creating a new PID namespace,
it is useful for the child to change its root directory
and mount a new procfs instance at
.I /proc
so that tools such as
.BR ps (1)
work correctly.
.\" mount -t proc proc /proc
(If a new mount namespace is simultaneously created by including
.BR CLONE_NEWNS
in the
.IR flags
argument of
.BR clone (2)
or
.BR unshare (2)),
then it isn't necessary to change the root directory:
a new procfs instance can be mounted directly over
.IR /proc .)

Calling
.BR readlink (2)
on the path
.I /proc/self
yields the process ID of the caller in the PID namespace of the procfs mount
(i.e., the PID namespace of the process that mounted the procfs).

When a process ID is passed over a UNIX domain socket to a
process in a different PID namespace (see the description of
.B SCM_CREDENTIALS
in
.BR unix (7)),
it is translated into the corresponding PID value in
the receiving process's PID namespace.
.SH CONFORMING TO
Namespaces are a Linux-specific feature.
.SH SEE ALSO
.BR unshare (1),
.BR clone (2),
.BR setns (2),
.BR unshare (2),
.BR proc (5),
.BR credentials (7),
.BR capabilities (7),
.BR user_namespaces (7),
.BR switch_root (8)

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