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Message-ID: <20130520141941.GA16412@breakpoint.cc>
Date: Mon, 20 May 2013 16:19:41 +0200
From: Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>
To: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>,
netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next] x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit against
spraying attacks
Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com> wrote:
> From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
>
> hpa bringed into my attention some security related issues
> with BPF JIT on x86.
>
> This patch makes sure the bpf generated code is marked read only,
> as other kernel text sections.
>
> It also splits the unused space (we vmalloc() and only use a fraction of
> the page) in two parts, so that the generated bpf code not starts at a
> known offset in the page, but a pseudo random one.
>
> Refs:
> http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html
What about emitting additional instructions at random locations in the
generated code itself?
Eg., after every instruction, have random chance to insert
'xor $0xcc,%al; xor $0xcc,%al', etc?
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