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Message-Id: <1379646913-12445-2-git-send-email-geyslan@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Sep 2013 00:15:13 -0300
From: "Geyslan G. Bem" <geyslan@...il.com>
To: viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
joe@...ches.com
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, "Geyslan G. Bem" <geyslan@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 2/2] ia32_aout: x86_64: Add safe check in a.out loaders, printks, conding style fixes
ia32_aout had no safe checks concerning the mmap and f_op in this module.
It's not necessary to verify f_op in the load_aout_library, since the
prior kernel_read/vfs_read function already does.
Made coding style fixes and printks replacements.
Tested using qemu, a handcrafted a.out binary and an a.out linked with a
cross-compiled ld.
Signed-off-by: Geyslan G. Bem <geyslan@...il.com>
---
arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c
index bae3aba..87d5114 100644
--- a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c
+++ b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c
@@ -24,9 +24,9 @@
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
-#include <linux/jiffies.h>
+#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
-#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
#include <asm/user32.h>
@@ -224,9 +224,9 @@ static u32 __user *create_aout_tables(char __user *p, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
int argc = bprm->argc, envc = bprm->envc;
sp = (u32 __user *) ((-(unsigned long)sizeof(u32)) & (unsigned long) p);
- sp -= envc+1;
+ sp -= envc + 1;
envp = sp;
- sp -= argc+1;
+ sp -= argc + 1;
argv = sp;
put_user((unsigned long) envp, --sp);
put_user((unsigned long) argv, --sp);
@@ -271,10 +271,17 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
N_MAGIC(ex) != QMAGIC && N_MAGIC(ex) != NMAGIC) ||
N_TRSIZE(ex) || N_DRSIZE(ex) ||
i_size_read(file_inode(bprm->file)) <
- ex.a_text+ex.a_data+N_SYMSIZE(ex)+N_TXTOFF(ex)) {
+ ex.a_text + ex.a_data + N_SYMSIZE(ex) + N_TXTOFF(ex)) {
return -ENOEXEC;
}
+ /*
+ * Requires a mmap handler. This prevents people from using a.out
+ * as part of an exploit attack against /proc-related vulnerabilities.
+ */
+ if (!bprm->file->f_op || !bprm->file->f_op->mmap)
+ return -ENOEXEC;
+
fd_offset = N_TXTOFF(ex);
/* Check initial limits. This avoids letting people circumvent
@@ -322,7 +329,7 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
unsigned long text_addr, map_size;
text_addr = N_TXTADDR(ex);
- map_size = ex.a_text+ex.a_data;
+ map_size = ex.a_text + ex.a_data;
error = vm_brk(text_addr & PAGE_MASK, map_size);
@@ -339,28 +346,19 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
}
} else {
#ifdef WARN_OLD
- static unsigned long error_time, error_time2;
if ((ex.a_text & 0xfff || ex.a_data & 0xfff) &&
- (N_MAGIC(ex) != NMAGIC) &&
- time_after(jiffies, error_time2 + 5*HZ)) {
- printk(KERN_NOTICE "executable not page aligned\n");
- error_time2 = jiffies;
- }
+ (N_MAGIC(ex) != NMAGIC))
+ pr_notice_ratelimited("executable not page aligned\n");
- if ((fd_offset & ~PAGE_MASK) != 0 &&
- time_after(jiffies, error_time + 5*HZ)) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING
- "fd_offset is not page aligned. Please convert "
- "program: %s\n",
- bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name);
- error_time = jiffies;
- }
+ if ((fd_offset & ~PAGE_MASK) != 0)
+ pr_warn_ratelimited("fd_offset is not page aligned. Please convert program: %s\n",
+ bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name);
#endif
- if (!bprm->file->f_op->mmap || (fd_offset & ~PAGE_MASK) != 0) {
- vm_brk(N_TXTADDR(ex), ex.a_text+ex.a_data);
+ if ((fd_offset & ~PAGE_MASK) != 0) {
+ vm_brk(N_TXTADDR(ex), ex.a_text + ex.a_data);
read_code(bprm->file, N_TXTADDR(ex), fd_offset,
- ex.a_text+ex.a_data);
+ ex.a_text + ex.a_data);
goto beyond_if;
}
@@ -424,10 +422,17 @@ static int load_aout_library(struct file *file)
if ((N_MAGIC(ex) != ZMAGIC && N_MAGIC(ex) != QMAGIC) || N_TRSIZE(ex) ||
N_DRSIZE(ex) || ((ex.a_entry & 0xfff) && N_MAGIC(ex) == ZMAGIC) ||
i_size_read(file_inode(file)) <
- ex.a_text+ex.a_data+N_SYMSIZE(ex)+N_TXTOFF(ex)) {
+ ex.a_text + ex.a_data + N_SYMSIZE(ex) + N_TXTOFF(ex)) {
goto out;
}
+ /*
+ * Requires a mmap handler. This prevents people from using a.out
+ * as part of an exploit attack against /proc-related vulnerabilities.
+ */
+ if (!file->f_op->mmap)
+ goto out;
+
if (N_FLAGS(ex))
goto out;
@@ -438,14 +443,8 @@ static int load_aout_library(struct file *file)
if ((N_TXTOFF(ex) & ~PAGE_MASK) != 0) {
#ifdef WARN_OLD
- static unsigned long error_time;
- if (time_after(jiffies, error_time + 5*HZ)) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING
- "N_TXTOFF is not page aligned. Please convert "
- "library: %s\n",
- file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name);
- error_time = jiffies;
- }
+ pr_warn_ratelimited("N_TXTOFF is not page aligned. Please convert library: %s\n",
+ file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name);
#endif
vm_brk(start_addr, ex.a_text + ex.a_data + ex.a_bss);
--
1.8.4
--
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