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Message-ID: <1380170403.32302.52.camel@linux-s257.site>
Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2013 12:40:03 +0800
From: joeyli <jlee@...e.com>
To: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>,
Alan Stern <stern@...land.harvard.edu>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org,
linux-pm@...r.kernel.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
opensuse-kernel@...nsuse.org, "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@...k.pl>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
Len Brown <len.brown@...el.com>,
Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...hat.com>,
Vojtech Pavlik <vojtech@...e.cz>,
Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@...el.com>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, JKosina@...e.com,
Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.hengli.com.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Michal Marek <mmarek@...e.cz>,
Gary Lin <GLin@...e.com>, Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC V4 PATCH 00/15] Signature verification of hibernate
snapshot
於 四,2013-09-26 於 02:27 +0200,Pavel Machek 提到:
> On Wed 2013-09-25 15:16:54, James Bottomley wrote:
> > On Wed, 2013-09-25 at 17:25 -0400, Alan Stern wrote:
> > > On Wed, 25 Sep 2013, David Howells wrote:
> > >
> > > > I have pushed some keyrings patches that will likely affect this to:
> > > >
> > > > http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/log/?h=keys-devel
> > > >
> > > > I intend to ask James to pull these into his next branch. If he's happy to do
> > > > so, I can look at pulling at least your asymmetric keys patch on top of them.
> > >
> > > This suggests a point that I raised at the Linux Plumbers conference:
> > >
> > > Why are asymmetric keys used for verifying the hibernation image? It
> > > seems that a symmetric key would work just as well. And it would be a
> > > lot quicker to generate, because it wouldn't need any high-precision
> > > integer computations.
> >
> > The reason is the desire to validate that the previous kernel created
> > something which it passed on to the current kernel (in this case, the
> > hibernation image) untampered with. To do that, something must be
> > passed to the prior kernel that can be validated but *not* recreated by
> > the current kernel.
>
> I don't get this. Why is it important that current kernel can't
> recreate the signature?
>
> Current kernel is not considered malicious (if it were, you have worse
> problems).
>
Current boot kernel should not malicious especially when UEFI secure
boot enabled.
> Pavel
>
> PS: And yes, it would be nice to have
> Documentation/power/swsusp-uefi.txt (or something) explaining the
> design.
>
Thanks for your suggestion, I will write the swsusp-uefi.txt to
explaining the design in next version.
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
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