linux-kernel - Re: [RFC V4 PATCH 00/15] Signature verification of hibernate snapshot

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Date:	Thu, 26 Sep 2013 08:24:41 +0200 (CEST)
From:	Jiri Kosina <jiri.kosina@...e.com>
To:	James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>
Cc:	Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
	Alan Stern <stern@...land.harvard.edu>,
	David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
	"Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@...il.com>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-pm@...r.kernel.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
	opensuse-kernel@...nsuse.org, "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@...k.pl>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
	Len Brown <len.brown@...el.com>,
	Josh Boyer <jwboyer@...hat.com>,
	Vojtech Pavlik <vojtech@...e.cz>,
	Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@...el.com>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.hengli.com.au>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Michal Marek <mmarek@...e.cz>,
	Gary Lin <GLin@...e.com>, Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>,
	"Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@...e.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC V4 PATCH 00/15] Signature verification of hibernate
 snapshot

On Wed, 25 Sep 2013, James Bottomley wrote:

> > I don't get this. Why is it important that current kernel can't
> > recreate the signature?
> 
> The thread model is an attack on the saved information (i.e. the suspend
> image) between it being saved by the old kernel and used by the new one.
> The important point isn't that the new kernel doesn't have access to
> K_{N-1} it's that no-one does: the key is destroyed as soon as the old
> kernel terminates however the verification public part P_{N-1} survives.

James,

could you please describe the exact scenario you think that the symmetric 
keys aproach doesn't protect against, while the assymetric key aproach 
does?

The crucial points, which I believe make the symmetric key aproach work 
(and I feel quite embarassed by the fact that I haven't realized this 
initially when coming up with the assymetric keys aproach) are:

- the kernel that is performing the actual resumption is trusted in the 
  secure boot model, i.e. you trust it to perform proper verification

- potentially malicious userspace (which is what we are protecting against 
  -- malicious root creating fake hibernation image and issuing reboot) 
  doesn't have access to the symmetric key

-- 
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs
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