linux-kernel - [PATCH 01/11] random: fix typos / spelling errors in comments

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Date:	Thu, 7 Nov 2013 18:57:35 -0500
From:	Greg Price <price@....EDU>
To:	"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 01/11] random: fix typos / spelling errors in comments

Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Price <price@....edu>
---
 drivers/char/random.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 7a744d3..ef3e15b 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -348,12 +348,12 @@ static struct poolinfo {
 
 /*
  * For the purposes of better mixing, we use the CRC-32 polynomial as
- * well to make a twisted Generalized Feedback Shift Reigster
+ * well to make a twisted Generalized Feedback Shift Register
  *
  * (See M. Matsumoto & Y. Kurita, 1992.  Twisted GFSR generators.  ACM
  * Transactions on Modeling and Computer Simulation 2(3):179-194.
  * Also see M. Matsumoto & Y. Kurita, 1994.  Twisted GFSR generators
- * II.  ACM Transactions on Mdeling and Computer Simulation 4:254-266)
+ * II.  ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer Simulation 4:254-266)
  *
  * Thanks to Colin Plumb for suggesting this.
  *
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ static struct poolinfo {
  * modulo the generator polymnomial.  Now, for random primitive polynomials,
  * this is a universal class of hash functions, meaning that the chance
  * of a collision is limited by the attacker's knowledge of the generator
- * polynomail, so if it is chosen at random, an attacker can never force
+ * polynomial, so if it is chosen at random, an attacker can never force
  * a collision.  Here, we use a fixed polynomial, but we *can* assume that
  * ###--> it is unknown to the processes generating the input entropy. <-###
  * Because of this important property, this is a good, collision-resistant
@@ -943,7 +943,7 @@ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out)
 	hash.w[2] ^= rol32(hash.w[2], 16);
 
 	/*
-	 * If we have a architectural hardware random number
+	 * If we have an architectural hardware random number
 	 * generator, mix that in, too.
 	 */
 	for (i = 0; i < LONGS(EXTRACT_SIZE); i++) {
-- 
1.8.3.2

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