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Message-ID: <52E6E786.80301@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2014 10:11:02 +1100
From: Ryan Mallon <rmallon@...il.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
CC: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>, Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Olof Johansson <olof@...om.net>,
Stepan Moskovchenko <stepanm@...eaurora.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] vsprintf: BUG on %n
On 28/01/14 10:03, Kees Cook wrote:
> Now that there has been a full release of the kernel, and all users
> of %n have been dropped, switch to %n use triggering a BUG. Ignoring
> arguments could be used to assist in information leaks if an arbitrary
> format string was under the control of an attacker.
Not sure I follow the reasoning. %n no longer does anything in the
kernel, so there is no risk if it does manage to find its way into a
printed string. BUG() is for unrecoverable errors, which this clearly isn't.
Information leaks via injectable strings are still possible if an
attacker can insert %x, %d, etc. %n is more problematic since it allows
for code injection, which is why it got removed. %n is not however,
required to get an infoleak via a format string, so I think the summary
is also a bit misleading.
~Ryan
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> ---
> lib/vsprintf.c | 13 +++++--------
> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
> index 185b6d300ebc..a27fd7f61325 100644
> --- a/lib/vsprintf.c
> +++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
> @@ -1735,15 +1735,12 @@ int vsnprintf(char *buf, size_t size, const char *fmt, va_list args)
> case FORMAT_TYPE_NRCHARS: {
> /*
> * Since %n poses a greater security risk than
> - * utility, ignore %n and skip its argument.
> + * utility, it should not be implemented. Instead,
> + * BUG when encountering %n, since there are no
> + * legitimate users and skipping arguments could
> + * assist information leak attacks.
> */
> - void *skip_arg;
> -
> - WARN_ONCE(1, "Please remove ignored %%n in '%s'\n",
> - old_fmt);
> -
> - skip_arg = va_arg(args, void *);
> - break;
> + BUG();
> }
>
> default:
>
--
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