[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20140221120538.GB8729@mguzik.brq.redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2014 13:05:38 +0100
From: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@...hat.com>
To: Dave Jones <davej@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kref: oops on zero or negative refcount
On Thu, Feb 20, 2014 at 01:14:40PM -0500, Dave Jones wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 20, 2014 at 06:44:59PM +0100, Mateusz Guzik wrote:
> > In use after free situations, it is possible for one thread to write to
> > memory that has just been reallocated to a new user. This could open up
> > potential security issues.
> >
> > diff --git a/include/linux/kref.h b/include/linux/kref.h
> > index 484604d..c3f8a0a 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/kref.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/kref.h
> > @@ -43,8 +43,10 @@ static inline void kref_get(struct kref *kref)
> > /* If refcount was 0 before incrementing then we have a race
> > * condition when this kref is freeing by some other thread right now.
> > * In this case one should use kref_get_unless_zero()
> > + *
> > + * Terminate the current thread to stop potential security exploits.
> > */
> > - WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_inc_return(&kref->refcount) < 2);
> > + BUG_ON(atomic_inc_return(&kref->refcount) < 2);
>
> This isn't "terminating the thread", this is "lock up the box".
>
Well, extent of damage caused by non-panicking BUG_ON (if any) depends
on the state when kref_get was executed.
However, since this condition is already a sign of big trouble (and a
potential exploitation attempt), I think a WARN_ON_ONCE is not
sufficient.
That said, can you elaborate on your concers? You just don't like that
comment, don't want that BUG_ON (want a panic instead) or maybe you
don't like the change at all (or something else)?
Thanks,
--
Mateusz Guzik
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists