linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] x86, kaslr: randomize module base load address

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Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+SHTm5MbzWSaMABSv-ZJHrzSCm2ts-rUAoTVjTFidyAw@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Fri, 21 Feb 2014 13:21:54 -0800
From:	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:	LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
	"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
	Jianguo Wu <wujianguo@...wei.com>,
	Andy Honig <ahonig@...gle.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86, kaslr: randomize module base load address

On Fri, Feb 21, 2014 at 1:15 PM, Andrew Morton
<akpm@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
> On Fri, 21 Feb 2014 13:05:08 -0800 Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>
>> >> +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
>> >> +static unsigned long module_load_offset;
>> >> +static int randomize_modules = 1;
>> >
>> > It's pretty common for people to later come back and say "hey I want to
>> > set the default in Kconfig".  Perhaps we should do that from day 1.
>>
>> I've been slapped down for adding more config options in the past, and
>> I think it's unlikely that people using CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE won't
>> want the modules base randomized too. I think this is a safe default,
>> but if you see it as a requirement, I can change it.
>
> I think there were issues with some embedded systems where it's
> hard/impossible to provide/alter boot parameters.
>
> I suppose we can leave it this way until there are complaints.
>
>> > This implies that parse_nokaslr() will need to be renamed and taught to
>> > handle 0->1 changing.
>> >
>> >> +static int __init parse_nokaslr(char *p)
>> >> +{
>> >> +     randomize_modules = 0;
>> >> +     return 0;
>> >> +}
>> >> +early_param("nokaslr", parse_nokaslr);
>> >
>> > Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt, please.   This isn't hard :(
>>
>> "nokaslr" is already documented. Do you mean adding a note about
>> modules as well to the existing documentation?
>
> Yes, it should now mention modules as well.

Okay, I will add this to the v2 patch.

>
>> >> +static unsigned long int get_module_load_offset(void)
>> >> +{
>> >> +     if (randomize_modules) {
>> >> +             mutex_lock(&module_mutex);
>> >> +             /*
>> >> +              * Calculate the module_load_offset the first time this
>> >> +              * code is called. Once calculated it stays the same until
>> >> +              * reboot.
>> >> +              */
>> >> +             if (module_load_offset == 0)
>> >> +                     module_load_offset =
>> >> +                             (get_random_int() % 1024 + 1) * PAGE_SIZE;
>> >> +             mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
>> >> +     }
>> >> +     return module_load_offset;
>> >> +}
>> >
>> > This seems unnecessarily complex and inefficient.  We only set
>> > module_load_offset a single time, so why not do it that way?
>> > Mark it __init, run it during initcalls then throw it away.
>>
>> I'd like to make sure this is running well after the pRNG is up and
>> running. I can run some tests to see how the entropy looks if this is
>> done during __init, though.
>
> That may be a bit optimistic, dunno.  I suppose that doing it this way
> we will already have done a bit of disk IO, so there will be more
> randomness.

Right -- it's probably not much, but this doesn't seem like much
overhead for module loading. It's a relatively infrequent event.

> btw, would it be better to make each module have its own offset rather
> than using the same offset for all of them?  That could cause problems
> with vmap space fragmentation I guess.

Right -- we felt this was sufficient. And in my experience, other
attempts and trying to do per-allocat randomization and avoid the
fragmentation problem (e.g. "greedy random positioning"), like done
with RedHat's ASCII-Armor memory randomization proved to have _less_
entropy than just randomizing the base address.

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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