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Message-ID: <22093.1394727459@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2014 16:17:39 +0000
From: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To: unlisted-recipients:; (no To-header on input)
Cc: dhowells@...hat.com, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com,
keyrings@...ux-nfs.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: RFC: 'ioctl' for keyrings
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com> wrote:
> I can fix this in one of a number of ways:
>
> (1) Provide a generic control operation (analogous with ioctl()) that allows
> the user to make some general operation on a key (querying it, altering
> it, interacting with hardware).
>
> (2) Provide an alter operation that only allows the key to be altered.
> Looking at trusted_update(), though, I have a suspicion that this may not
> be sufficient as that also seems to invoke an interaction with the TPM.
>
> (3) Provide separate, specific keyctl functions for the special operations
> required by encrypted and trusted keys (and other key types potentially)
> that are then validated in the core and routed to the key type.
(4) Simply make key_update() look for the encrypted and trusted key types
and call a special key type op for those. The main ->update op will be
taking preparsed data and would no longer be callable in this situation.
David
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