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Message-ID: <1394728800.8457.48.camel@dhcp-9-2-203-236.watson.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2014 12:40:00 -0400
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Cc: torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com,
keyrings@...ux-nfs.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: RFC: 'ioctl' for keyrings
On Thu, 2014-03-13 at 16:17 +0000, David Howells wrote:
> David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com> wrote:
>
> > I can fix this in one of a number of ways:
> >
> > (1) Provide a generic control operation (analogous with ioctl()) that allows
> > the user to make some general operation on a key (querying it, altering
> > it, interacting with hardware).
> >
> > (2) Provide an alter operation that only allows the key to be altered.
> > Looking at trusted_update(), though, I have a suspicion that this may not
> > be sufficient as that also seems to invoke an interaction with the TPM.
> >
> > (3) Provide separate, specific keyctl functions for the special operations
> > required by encrypted and trusted keys (and other key types potentially)
> > that are then validated in the core and routed to the key type.
>
> (4) Simply make key_update() look for the encrypted and trusted key types
> and call a special key type op for those. The main ->update op will be
> taking preparsed data and would no longer be callable in this situation.
I prefer this last option. Define a separate 'update' option for trusted
and encrypted keys, which would only create or modify, but never replace
an existing key.
thanks,
Mimi
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