linux-kernel - Re: Kernel panic at Ubuntu: IMA + Apparmor

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Message-ID: <CACE9dm-fdqDgFT5Pw1ry6XOuAhqmsEEiQMOFw=rooazBkdx-wg@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Sat, 26 Apr 2014 00:46:25 +0300
From:	Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>
To:	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Cc:	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
	Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
	John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	kernel-team <kernel-team@...ts.ubuntu.com>
Subject: Re: Kernel panic at Ubuntu: IMA + Apparmor

On 26 April 2014 00:27, Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com> wrote:
> Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com> writes:
>
>> On 25 April 2014 23:45, Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com> wrote:
>>> Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com> writes:
>>>
>>>> On 25 April 2014 23:01, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com> wrote:
>>>>> On 04/25, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com> writes:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> > Well. I _think_ that __fput() and ima_file_free() in particular should not
>>>>>> > depend on current and/or current->nsproxy. If nothing else, fput() can be
>>>>>> > called by the unrelated task which looks into /proc/pid/.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > But again, task_work_add() has more and more users, and it seems that even
>>>>>> > __fput() paths can do "everything", so perhaps it would be safer to allow
>>>>>> > to use ->nsproxy in task_work_run.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Like I said, give me a clear motivating case.
>>>>>
>>>>> I agree, we need a reason. Currently I do not see one.
>>>>>
>>>>>> Right now not allowing
>>>>>> nsproxy is turning up bugs in __fput.  Which seems like a good thing.
>>>>>
>>>>> This is what I certainly agree with ;)
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Hi,
>>>>
>>>> IMA uses kernel_read API which does not know anything about caller.
>>>> And of course security frameworks are at guard as usual.
>>>>
>>>> Exactly after reading first Eric's respons, I thought why to scratch
>>>> the head when task work queues are indeed designed for tasks...
>>>
>>> __fput has no guarantee of running in the task that close the file
>>> descriptor.  If your code depends on that your code is broken.
>>>
>>>> And if you to dig for the history, IMA-appraisal was stuck due to
>>>> lockdep reporting even though it was on non-everlaping cases.
>>>> IIRC files vs. directories...
>>>>
>>>> After that IIRC Al Viro discussed about delayed fput and IIRC Oleg
>>>> (sorry if I am wrong) introduced task work queues.
>>>>
>>>> So IMA-appraisal was able to be upstreamed... That was ~3.4 time frame, IIRC
>>>>
>>>> Name space also dated around ~3.4??
>>>> Apparmor namespace change was also around that time.
>>>>
>>>> 3.10 introduces this name space order change and broke IMA-appraisal.
>>>
>>> IMA-appraisal is fundamentally broken because I can take a mandatory
>>> file lock and prevent IMA-apprasial.
>>>
>>
>> What file lock are you talking about?
>> IMA-appraisal does not depends on file locks...
>
> It honors them.  Look at rw_verify_area, in vfs_read, in kernel_read.
>
> It sure looks like locks_mandatory_area can cause your kernel_read to
> fail.
>
>>> Using kernel_read is what allows this.
>>>
>>>> Isn't it a clear motivating case???
>>>
>>> kernel_read is not appropriate for IMA use.  The rest of this is just
>>> the messenger.
>>>
>>> IMA needs to use a cousin of kernel_read that operates at a lower level
>>> than vfs_read.  A function that all of the permission checks and the
>>> fsnotify work.
>>>
>>> I am sorry to be the bearer of bad news.  But kernel_read is totally
>>> inappropriate for IMA.
>>>
>>
>> So you break IMA-appraisal and declare that it cannot be used now?
>
> I didn't break it.  I read the code, and I read the back trace to see
> where the bug was.
>
> I see IMA-appraisal trying to read file data as if it were a user space
> application in such a way that it can get permission denied for a whole
> host of reasons.
>
> My understanding of IMA-appraisal is that using a code path that can
> give use permission denined when performing appraisal is a way for
> clever people to attack and avoid IMA-appraisal without violating any
> security policy.
>

Interesting thing is that file was already open before and LSM gave OK for this.
Then re-reading the file on close in fact does not need any LSM
permission checks.
But as kernel_read API is still the same, it goes via the same checks...

But on close with delayed fput nsproxy is missing ....

> Am I wrong.  Is it ok for IMA-appraisal to get permission denied when it
> wants to appraise a file?
>

IMA is called after may_open...


> Eric



-- 
Thanks,
Dmitry
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