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Message-ID: <1400533578.8244.9.camel@dhcp-9-2-203-236.watson.ibm.com>
Date: Mon, 19 May 2014 17:06:18 -0400
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: "J. R. Okajima" <hooanon05g@...il.com>
Cc: linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v1] ima: audit log files opened with O_DIRECT flag
Files are measured or appraised based on the IMA policy. When a
file, in policy, is opened with the O_DIRECT flag, a deadlock
occurs.
The first attempt at resolving this lockdep temporarily removed the
O_DIRECT flag and restored it, after calculating the hash. The
second attempt introduced the O_DIRECT_HAVELOCK flag. Based on this
flag, do_blockdev_direct_IO() would skip taking the i_mutex a second
time. The third attempt, by Dmitry Kasatkin, resolves the i_mutex
locking issue, by re-introducing the IMA mutex, but uncovered
another problem. Reading a file with O_DIRECT flag set, writes
directly to userspace pages. A second patch allocates a user-space
like memory. This works for all IMA hooks, except ima_file_free(),
which is called on __fput() to recalculate the file hash.
Until this last issue is addressed, do not 'collect' the
measurement for measuring, appraising, or auditing files opened
with the O_DIRECT flag set. Based on policy, permit or deny file
access. This patch defines a new IMA policy rule option named
'permit_directio'. Policy rules could be defined, based on LSM
or other criteria, to permit specific applications to open files
with the O_DIRECT flag set.
Changelog v1:
- permit or deny file access based IMA policy rules
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 10 +++++++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 5 ++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 6 +++++-
security/integrity/integrity.h | 1 +
5 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index f1c5cc9..4c3efe4 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Description:
[fowner]]
lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
[obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
- option: [[appraise_type=]]
+ option: [[appraise_type=]] [permit_directio]
base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK]
mask:= [MAY_READ] [MAY_WRITE] [MAY_APPEND] [MAY_EXEC]
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index ba9e4d7..d719978 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value,
int *xattr_len)
{
+ const char *audit_cause = "failed";
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
const char *filename = file->f_dentry->d_name.name;
int result = 0;
@@ -213,6 +214,12 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
if (!(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) {
u64 i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version;
+ if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) {
+ audit_cause = "failed(directio)";
+ result = -EACCES;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
/* use default hash algorithm */
hash.hdr.algo = ima_hash_algo;
@@ -233,9 +240,10 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
result = -ENOMEM;
}
}
+out:
if (result)
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
- filename, "collect_data", "failed",
+ filename, "collect_data", audit_cause,
result, 0);
return result;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 52ac6cf..27ab5df 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -214,8 +214,11 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
xattr_ptr = &xattr_value;
rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, xattr_ptr, &xattr_len);
- if (rc != 0)
+ if (rc != 0) {
+ if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)
+ rc = (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO) ? 0 : -EACCES;
goto out_digsig;
+ }
pathname = filename ?: ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 93873a4..40a7488 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ enum {
Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid, Opt_fowner,
- Opt_appraise_type, Opt_fsuuid
+ Opt_appraise_type, Opt_fsuuid, Opt_permit_directio
};
static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
@@ -375,6 +375,7 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
{Opt_uid, "uid=%s"},
{Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"},
{Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
+ {Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"},
{Opt_err, NULL}
};
@@ -622,6 +623,9 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
else
result = -EINVAL;
break;
+ case Opt_permit_directio:
+ entry->flags |= IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO;
+ break;
case Opt_err:
ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
result = -EINVAL;
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 2fb5e53..33c0a70 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#define IMA_ACTION_FLAGS 0xff000000
#define IMA_DIGSIG 0x01000000
#define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED 0x02000000
+#define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO 0x04000000
#define IMA_DO_MASK (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \
IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
--
1.8.1.4
--
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