linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] x32: Mask away the x32 syscall bit in the ptrace codepath

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Message-ID: <CALCETrWd9dbBt03u5cpJx+p3D7NeT-d2_=kTg94CRGMq7ji7kQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Wed, 28 May 2014 14:15:07 -0700
From:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To:	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...ux.intel.com>
Cc:	Philipp Kern <pkern@...gle.com>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	"H. J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x32: Mask away the x32 syscall bit in the ptrace codepath

On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 2:01 PM, H. Peter Anvin <hpa@...ux.intel.com> wrote:
> On 05/28/2014 01:47 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On 05/28/2014 05:19 AM, Philipp Kern wrote:
>>> audit_filter_syscall uses the syscall number to reference into a
>>> bitmask (e->rule.mask[word]). Not removing the x32 bit before passing
>>> the number to this architecture independent codepath will fail to
>>> lookup the proper audit bit. Furthermore it will cause an invalid memory
>>> access in the kernel if the out of bound location is not mapped:
>>>
>>>   BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff8800e5446630
>>>   IP: [<ffffffff810fcdd0>] audit_filter_syscall+0x90/0xf0
>>>
>>> Together with the entrypoint in entry_64.S this change causes x32
>>> programs to pass in both AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64 and AUDIT_ARCH_I386 depending
>>> on the syscall path.
>>>
>>> Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
>>> Cc: H. J. Lu <hjl.tools@...il.com>
>>> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
>>> Signed-off-by: Philipp Kern <pkern@...gle.com>
>>> ---
>>>  arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c | 2 +-
>>>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
>>> index 678c0ad..166a3c7 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
>>> @@ -1489,7 +1489,7 @@ long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
>>>
>>>      if (IS_IA32)
>>>              audit_syscall_entry(AUDIT_ARCH_I386,
>>> -                                regs->orig_ax,
>>> +                                regs->orig_ax & __SYSCALL_MASK,
>>
>> This is weird.  Three questions:
>>
>> 1. How can this happen?  I thought that x32 syscalls always came in
>> through the syscall path, which doesn't set is_compat_task.  (Can
>> someone rename is_compat_task to in_compat_syscall?  Pretty please?)
>
> The SYSCALL path doesn't set TS_COMPAT, but is_compat_task() looks both
> as TS_COMPAT and bit 30 of orig_ax.
>
> I think what is really needed here is IS_IA32 should use is_ia32_task()
> instead, and *that* is the context we can mask off the x32 bit in at
> all.  However, does audit not need that information?

This is thoroughly fscked up.

What *should* have happened is that there should have been an
AUDIT_ARCH_X32.  Unfortunately no one caught that in time, so the
current enshrined ABI is that, as far as seccomp is concerned, x32 is
AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64 (see syscall_get_arch) but nr has the x32 bit set.

But the audit code is different: x32 is AUDIT_ARCH_I386 and the x32
bit is set.  This may be changeable, since fixes to the audit ABI may
not break anything.  Can we just use syscall_get_arch to determine the
token to pass to the audit code?

If it makes everyone feel better, I think that every single
architecture has screwed this up.  We actually had to prevent seccomp
and audit from being configured in on any OABI-supporting ARM kernel,
and MIPS almost did the same thing that x32 did.  We caught that one
on time, and it's now fixed in Linus' tree.

>
> (And why the frakk does audit receive the first four syscall arguments?
>  Audit seems like the worst turd ever...)

If you ever benchmark the performance impact of merely running auditd,
you might have to upgrade that insult :-/

>
>> 2. Now audit can't tell whether a syscall is x32 or i386.  And audit is
>> inconsistent with seccomp.  This seems wrong.
>
> This is completely and totally bogus, indeed.

I'd suggest just fixing the bug in auditsc.c.

>
>> 3. The OOPS you're fixing doesn't seem like it's fixed.  What if some
>> other random high bits are set?
>
> There is a range check in entry_*.S for the system call.

I can imagine that causing a certain amount of confusion to fancy
seccomp users.  Oh, well.  No one that I know of has complained yet.

--Andy
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