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Message-ID: <CALCETrUD75vSwJUjFuxGCrZ_7DJhCc1KW2v_ndF6EHJ31fUMBg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2014 15:35:02 -0700
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
linux-audit@...hat.com,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking
On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 3:30 PM, Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> wrote:
> On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 11:09:58PM -0400, Eric Paris wrote:
>> From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
>>
>> Fixes an easy DoS and possible information disclosure.
>>
>> This does nothing about the broken state of x32 auditing.
>>
>> eparis: If the admin has enabled auditd and has specifically loaded audit
>> rules. This bug has been around since before git. Wow...
>>
>> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
>> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
>> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
>> ---
>> kernel/auditsc.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++---------
>> 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> Did this patch get dropped somewhere? Isn't it a valid bugfix, or did I
> miss a later conversation about this?
Hmm. It seems that it didn't make it into Linus' tree. Crap.
IMO we need some kind of real tracking system for issues reported to
security@. This shouldn't have been possible (and if I'd realized
that the patch got dropped, I wouldn't have publicly disclosed it).
For whoever applies this: it's CVE-2014-3917.
--Andy
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