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Message-ID: <CALCETrWb9HsaUWaQA+1ga6sH2_yUT=NEg-oKx=zFUQ5AZUqPaA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2014 15:55:20 -0700
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
linux-audit@...hat.com,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking
On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 3:46 PM, Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 09, 2014 at 03:35:02PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 3:30 PM, Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> wrote:
>> > On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 11:09:58PM -0400, Eric Paris wrote:
>> >> From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
>> >>
>> >> Fixes an easy DoS and possible information disclosure.
>> >>
>> >> This does nothing about the broken state of x32 auditing.
>> >>
>> >> eparis: If the admin has enabled auditd and has specifically loaded audit
>> >> rules. This bug has been around since before git. Wow...
>> >>
>> >> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
>> >> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
>> >> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
>> >> ---
>> >> kernel/auditsc.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++---------
>> >> 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>> >
>> > Did this patch get dropped somewhere? Isn't it a valid bugfix, or did I
>> > miss a later conversation about this?
>>
>> Hmm. It seems that it didn't make it into Linus' tree. Crap.
>>
>> IMO we need some kind of real tracking system for issues reported to
>> security@.
>
> That seems to be my mbox at times :)
>
> But yes, having something "real" might be good if the load gets higher,
> right now it's so low that my "sweep pending security patches" task
> usually catches anything pending, which is rare.
>
There are currently at least two issues that I reported that are stuck
in limbo: this one and the (not-yet-public) vfs thing. And there's
the CVE-2014-0181 regression fix that almost got forgotten, but that
isn't really a security issue.
And I can't read your mbox :-/
--Andy
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