linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v8 9/9] seccomp: implement SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG

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Message-ID: <20140625142121.GD7892@redhat.com>
Date:	Wed, 25 Jun 2014 16:21:21 +0200
From:	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
To:	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
	"Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...mgrid.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@...hat.com>,
	Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
	Julien Tinnes <jln@...omium.org>,
	David Drysdale <drysdale@...gle.com>,
	linux-api@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-mips@...ux-mips.org,
	linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 9/9] seccomp: implement SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC

On 06/24, Kees Cook wrote:
>
> +static void seccomp_sync_threads(void)
> +{
> +	struct task_struct *thread, *caller;
> +
> +	BUG_ON(!spin_is_locked(&current->sighand->siglock));
> +
> +	/* Synchronize all threads. */
> +	caller = current;
> +	for_each_thread(caller, thread) {
> +		/* Get a task reference for the new leaf node. */
> +		get_seccomp_filter(caller);
> +		/*
> +		 * Drop the task reference to the shared ancestor since
> +		 * current's path will hold a reference.  (This also
> +		 * allows a put before the assignment.)
> +		 */
> +		put_seccomp_filter(thread);
> +		thread->seccomp.filter = caller->seccomp.filter;
> +		/* Opt the other thread into seccomp if needed.
> +		 * As threads are considered to be trust-realm
> +		 * equivalent (see ptrace_may_access), it is safe to
> +		 * allow one thread to transition the other.
> +		 */
> +		if (thread->seccomp.mode == SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED) {
> +			/*
> +			 * Don't let an unprivileged task work around
> +			 * the no_new_privs restriction by creating
> +			 * a thread that sets it up, enters seccomp,
> +			 * then dies.
> +			 */
> +			if (task_no_new_privs(caller))
> +				task_set_no_new_privs(thread);
> +
> +			seccomp_assign_mode(thread, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER);
> +		}
> +	}
> +}

OK, personally I think this all make sense. I even think that perhaps
SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC should allow filter == NULL, a thread might
want to "sync" without adding the new filter, but this is minor/offtopic.

But. Doesn't this change add the new security hole?

Obviously, we should not allow to install a filter and then (say) exec
a suid binary, that is why we have no_new_privs/LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS.

But what if "thread->seccomp.filter = caller->seccomp.filter" races with
any user of task_no_new_privs() ? Say, suppose this thread has already
passed check_unsafe_exec/etc and it is going to exec the suid binary?

Oleg.

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