lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20140711142806.GA26441@mail.hallyn.com>
Date:	Fri, 11 Jul 2014 16:28:06 +0200
From:	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
To:	"chenhanxiao@...fujitsu.com" <chenhanxiao@...fujitsu.com>
Cc:	"Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@...ssion.com)" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
	"Serge Hallyn (serge.hallyn@...ntu.com)" <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	"containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org" 
	<containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Could not mount sysfs when enable userns but disable netns

Quoting chenhanxiao@...fujitsu.com (chenhanxiao@...fujitsu.com):
> Hello,
> 
> How to reproduce:
> 1. Prepare a container, enable userns and disable netns
> 2. use libvirt-lxc to start a container
> 3. libvirt could not mount sysfs then failed to start.
> 
> Then I found that
> commit 7dc5dbc879bd0779924b5132a48b731a0bc04a1e says:
> "Don't allow mounting sysfs unless the caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN rights
> over the net namespace."
> 
> But why should we check sysfs mouont permission over net namespace?
> We've already checked CAP_SYS_ADMIN though.
> 
> What the relationship between sysfs and net namespace,
> or this check is a little redundant?

It is not redundant.  The whole point is that after clone(CLONE_NEWUSER)
you get a newly filled set of capabilities.  But you should not have
privileges over the host's network namesapce.  After you unshare a new
network namespace, you *should* have privilege over it.  So the fact
that we've already check CAP_SYS_ADMIN means nothing, because the
capabilities need to be targeted.

> Any insights on this?
> 
> Thanks,
> - Chen
> 
> PS: codes below could be a workaround
> 
> @@ -34,7 +35,8 @@ static struct dentry *sysfs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
>                 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !fs_fully_visible(fs_type))
>                         return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
>  
> -               if (!kobj_ns_current_may_mount(KOBJ_NS_TYPE_NET))
> +               if (current->nsproxy->net_ns != &init_net &&
> +                    !kobj_ns_current_may_mount(KOBJ_NS_TYPE_NET))
>                         return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
>         }
> _______________________________________________
> Containers mailing list
> Containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ