linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] CAPABILITIES: remove undefined caps from all processes

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:	Tue, 22 Jul 2014 16:25:56 +0000
From:	Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>
To:	Andrew Vagin <avagin@...allels.com>
Cc:	Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	Andrew Vagin <avagin@...nvz.org>,
	"Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@...nel.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
	Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>, Dan Walsh <dwalsh@...hat.com>,
	stable@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] CAPABILITIES: remove undefined caps from all processes

Quoting Andrew Vagin (avagin@...allels.com):
> On Mon, Jul 21, 2014 at 04:59:01PM -0400, Eric Paris wrote:
> > This is effectively a revert of 7b9a7ec565505699f503b4fcf61500dceb36e744
> > plus fixing it a different way...
> > 
> > We found, when trying to run an application from an application which
> > had dropped privs that the kernel does security checks on undefined
> > capability bits.  This was ESPECIALLY difficult to debug as those
> > undefined bits are hidden from /proc/$PID/status.
> > 
> > Consider a root application which drops all capabilities from ALL 4
> > capability sets.  We assume, since the application is going to set
> > eff/perm/inh from an array that it will clear not only the defined caps
> > less than CAP_LAST_CAP, but also the higher 28ish bits which are
> > undefined future capabilities.
> > 
> > The BSET gets cleared differently.  Instead it is cleared one bit at a
> > time.  The problem here is that in security/commoncap.c::cap_task_prctl()
> > we actually check the validity of a capability being read.  So any task
> > which attempts to 'read all things set in bset' followed by 'unset all
> > things set in bset' will not even attempt to unset the undefined bits
> > higher than CAP_LAST_CAP.
> > 
> > So the 'parent' will look something like:
> > CapInh:	0000000000000000
> > CapPrm:	0000000000000000
> > CapEff:	0000000000000000
> > CapBnd:	ffffffc000000000
> > 
> > All of this 'should' be fine.  Given that these are undefined bits that
> > aren't supposed to have anything to do with permissions.  But they do...
> > 
> > So lets now consider a task which cleared the eff/perm/inh completely
> > and cleared all of the valid caps in the bset (but not the invalid caps
> > it couldn't read out of the kernel).  We know that this is exactly what
> > the libcap-ng library does and what the go capabilities library does.
> > They both leave you in that above situation if you try to clear all of
> > you capapabilities from all 4 sets.  If that root task calls execve()
> > the child task will pick up all caps not blocked by the bset.  The bset
> > however does not block bits higher than CAP_LAST_CAP.  So now the child
> > task has bits in eff which are not in the parent.  These are
> > 'meaningless' undefined bits, but still bits which the parent doesn't
> > have.
> > 
> > The problem is now in cred_cap_issubset() (or any operation which does a
> > subset test) as the child, while a subset for valid cap bits, is not a
> > subset for invalid cap bits!  So now we set durring commit creds that
> > the child is not dumpable.  Given it is 'more priv' than its parent.  It
> > also means the parent cannot ptrace the child and other stupidity.
> > 
> > The solution here is 2 things.
> > 1) stop hiding capability bits in status
> > 	we hide those upper bits which meant I couldn't spot this issue
> > 2) stop giving any task undefined capability bits.  it's simple, it you
> > don't put those invalid bits in CAP_FULL_SET you won't get them in init
> > and you won't get them in any other task either.
> 
> Pls, look at the comment for my first patch: https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/10/5/374
> 
> The following command fails with this patch (and succeeds without).
> 
> [root@...gin-fc19-cr ~]# capsh --caps="all=eip" -- -c /bin/bash
> Unable to set capabilities [--caps=all=eip]

Thanks - so at least capset will need to mask what is passed in
by the user with CAP_FULL_SET.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/