linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v5 1/3] arm64: ptrace: reload a syscall number after ptrace operations

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <53D7440B.10006@linaro.org>
Date:	Tue, 29 Jul 2014 15:49:47 +0900
From:	AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@...aro.org>
To:	Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
CC:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
	Deepak Saxena <dsaxena@...aro.org>,
	Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
	"linaro-kernel@...ts.linaro.org" <linaro-kernel@...ts.linaro.org>,
	"linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org" 
	<linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <Catalin.Marinas@....com>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 1/3] arm64: ptrace: reload a syscall number after ptrace
 operations

On 07/25/2014 08:03 PM, Will Deacon wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 11:36:49AM +0100, AKASHI Takahiro wrote:
>> On 07/25/2014 12:01 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>>>> If so, then you risk (at least) introducing
>>>>>
>>>>> a nice user-triggerable OOPS if audit is enabled.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Can you please elaborate this?
>>>> Since I didn't find any definition of audit's behavior when syscall is
>>>> rewritten to -1, I thought it is reasonable to skip "exit tracing" of
>>>> "skipped" syscall.
>>>> (otherwise, "fake" seems to be more appropriate :)
>>>
>>> The audit entry hook will oops if you call it twice in a row without
>>> calling the exit hook in between.
>>
>> Thank you, I could reproduce this problem which hits BUG(in_syscall) in
>> audit_syscall_entry(). Really bad, and I fixed it in my next version and
>> now a "skipped" system call is also traced by audit.
>
> Can you reproduce this on arch/arm/ too? If so, we should also fix the code
> there.

As far as I tried on arm with syscall auditing enabled,

1) Changing a syscall number to -1 under seccomp doesn't hit BUG_ON(in_syscall).
2) But, in fact, audit_syscall_entry() is NOT called in this case because
    __secure_computing() returns -1 and then it causes the succeeding tracing
    in syscall_trace_enter(), including audit_syscall_entry(), skipped.
3) On the other hand, calling syscall(-1) from userspace hits BUG_ON because
    the return path, ret_slow_syscall, doesn't contain syscall_trace_exit().
4) When we re-write a syscall number to -1 without seccomp, we will also see
    BUG_ON hit, although I didn't try yet.

Fixing case 3 is easy, but should we also fix case 2?

Please note that, even if we call audit_syscall_exit() in case 2 or 3, no log against
syscall -1 will be recorded because audit_filter_syscall() doesn't allow logging
for any syscall number which is greater than 2048.
This behavior was introduced by Andy's patch, a3c54931, in v3.16-rc.
If the intention of "-1" is to fake a system call, this behavior seems to be a bit odd.

Thanks,
-Takahiro AKASHI


> Will
>
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/