linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v3 0/3] sched: Always check the integrity of the canary

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Message-ID: <20140911174408.GA1873@atomlin.usersys.redhat.com>
Date:	Thu, 11 Sep 2014 18:44:09 +0100
From:	Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@...hat.com>
To:	David Laight <David.Laight@...LAB.COM>
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/3] sched: Always check the integrity of the canary

On Thu, Sep 11, 2014 at 04:02:45PM +0000, David Laight wrote:
> From: Aaron Tomlin
> > Currently in the event of a stack overrun a call to schedule()
> > does not check for this type of corruption. This corruption is
> > often silent and can go unnoticed. However once the corrupted
> > region is examined at a later stage, the outcome is undefined
> > and often results in a sporadic page fault which cannot be
> > handled.
> > 
> > The first patch adds a canary to init_task's end of stack.
> > While the second patch provides a helper to determine the
> > integrity of the canary. The third checks for a stack
> > overrun and takes appropriate action since the damage
> > is already done, there is no point in continuing.
> 
> Clearly you've just been 'bitten' by a kernel stack overflow.
> But a simple 'canary' isn't going to find most of the overflows
> and will give an incorrect 'sense of security'.

Please note that this is not suppose to be a 'perfect' solution.
Rather a worth while check in this particular code path.
Let's assume that the canary is damaged. In this situation it is
rather likely that the thread_info object has been compromised too.

-- 
Aaron Tomlin
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