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Message-id: <2b752cc0ffc2738b9b0b69878ca6c304a6e3eb4b.1412241704.git.d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Thu, 02 Oct 2014 12:21:44 +0300
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>
To: zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, linux-ima-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, roberto.sassu@...ito.it
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com,
Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] ima: check ima_policy_flag in the ima_file_free() hook
ima_file_free() checks 'iint_initialized' unnecessarily, because
S_IMA flag would not be set if iint was not allocated. At the
same time integrity cache is allocated with SLAB_PANIC and kernel
will panic if allocation fails during kernel initialization.
So on running system iint_initialized is always true and can be
removed.
This patch uses lately introduced ima_policy_flag to test if IMA
is enabled by policy.
Changes in v3:
* not limiting test to IMA_APPRAISE (spotted by Roberto Sassu)
Changes in v2:
* 'iint_initialized' removal patch merged to this patch (requested
by Mimi)
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>
---
security/integrity/iint.c | 3 ---
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/integrity.h | 3 ---
3 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index a521edf..cc3eb4d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@ static struct rb_root integrity_iint_tree = RB_ROOT;
static DEFINE_RWLOCK(integrity_iint_lock);
static struct kmem_cache *iint_cache __read_mostly;
-int iint_initialized;
-
/*
* __integrity_iint_find - return the iint associated with an inode
*/
@@ -166,7 +164,6 @@ static int __init integrity_iintcache_init(void)
iint_cache =
kmem_cache_create("iint_cache", sizeof(struct integrity_iint_cache),
0, SLAB_PANIC, init_once);
- iint_initialized = 1;
return 0;
}
security_initcall(integrity_iintcache_init);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 62f59ec..72faf0b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
- if (!iint_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+ if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return;
iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index aafb468..f51ad65 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -169,6 +169,3 @@ static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
{
}
#endif
-
-/* set during initialization */
-extern int iint_initialized;
--
1.9.1
--
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