linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] [RFC] mnt: add ability to clone mntns starting with the current root

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Message-ID: <CALCETrV-HiknyfnPfy81kERn5vjy9ugiLb6aZfmz3ZeTNzgMXw@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Wed, 8 Oct 2014 16:41:12 -0700
From:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To:	Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>
Cc:	Rob Landley <rob@...dley.net>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
	Andrew Vagin <avagin@...allels.com>,
	Andrey Vagin <avagin@...nvz.org>,
	Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
	Andrey Vagin <avagin@...il.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...nvz.org>,
	Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...allels.com>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] [RFC] mnt: add ability to clone mntns starting with the
 current root

On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 4:38 PM, Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com> wrote:
> Quoting Andy Lutomirski (luto@...capital.net):
>> On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 2:36 PM, Rob Landley <rob@...dley.net> wrote:
>> > On 10/08/14 14:31, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> >> On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 12:23 PM, Eric W. Biederman
>> >> <ebiederm@...ssion.com> wrote:
>> >>> Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> writes:
>> >>>>> Maybe we want to say that rootfs should not be used if we are going to
>> >>>>> create containers...
>> >>>
>> >>> Today it is an assumption of the vfs that rootfs is mounted.  With
>> >>> rootfs mounted and pivot_root at the base of the mount stack you can
>> >>> make as minimal of a set of mounts as the vfs allows.
>> >>>
>> >>> Removing rootfs from the vfs requires an audit of everything that
>> >>> manipulates mounts.  It is not remotely a local excercise.
>> >>
>> >> Would it be a less invasive audit to allow different mount namespaces
>> >> to have different rootfses?
>> >
>> > I.E. The same way different namespaces have different init tasks?
>> >
>> > The abstraction containers has implemented here should be logically
>> > consistent.
>> >
>> >>>> Could we have an extra rootfs-like fs that is always completely empty,
>> >>>> doesn't allow any writes, and can sit at the bottom of container
>> >>>> namespace hierarchies?  If so, and if we add a new syscall that's like
>> >>>> pivot_root (or unshare) but prunes the hierarchy, then we could switch
>> >>>> to that rootfs then.
>> >>>
>> >>> Or equally have something that guarantees that rootfs is empty and
>> >>> read-only at the time the normal root filesystem is mounted.  That is
>> >>> certainly a much more localized change if we want to go there.
>> >>>
>> >>> I am half tempted to suggest that mount --move /some/path / be updated
>> >>> to make the old / just go away (perhaps to be replaced with a read-only
>> >>> empty rootfs).  That gets us into figuring out if we break userspace
>> >>> which is a big challenge.
>> >>
>> >> Hence my argument for a new syscall or entirely new operation.
>> >
>> > I'm still waiting for somebody to explain to my why chroot() shouldn't
>> > be changed to do this instead of adding a new syscall. (At least when
>> > mount namespace support is enabled.)
>>
>> Because chroot has no effect on the namespace at all.  If you fork and
>> the child chroots, the parent isn't chrooted.  And, more importantly
>> for my example, is a process has it's cwd as /foo, and then it forks
>> and the child chroots, then parent's ".." isn't changed as a result of
>> the chroot.
>>
>> >
>> >> mount(2) and friends are way too multiplexed right now.  I just found
>> >> yet another security bug due to the insanely complicated semantics of
>> >> the vfs syscalls.  (Yes, a different one from the one yesterday.)
>> >
>> > As the guy who rewrote busybox mount 3 times, and who just implemented a
>> > brand new one (toybox) from scratch:
>> >
>> > It's a bit fiddly, yes.
>> >
>> >> A new operation kills several birds with one stone.  It could look like:
>> >>
>> >> int mntns_change_root(int dfd, const char *path, int flags);
>> >>
>> >> return -EPERM if chrooted.
>> >
>> > Really?
>>
>> Now that CVE-2014-7970 is public: what the heck is pivot_root supposed
>> to do if the caller is chrooted?  The current behavior is obviously
>> incorrect (it leaks memory), but it's not entirely clear to me what
>> should happen.  I think it should either be disallowed or should have
>> well-defined semantics.
>>
>> For simplicity, if a new syscall for this is added, then I think that
>> the caller-is-chrooted case should be disallowed.  If someone needs it
>> and can articulate what the semantics should be, then I have no
>> problem with allowing it going forward.
>
> It's not that I'd have a need for that, but rather if for some
> reason I started out chrooted due to some bogus initramfs, I'd
> prefer to not have to feel like a criminial and escape the chroot
> first.

You already can't create a userns if you're chrooted (even if you have
global privilege).

--Andy
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