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Date:	Wed, 15 Oct 2014 00:23:29 +0200
From:	Dmitry Kasatkin <>
To:	Mimi Zohar <>
Cc:	Dmitry Kasatkin <>,
	Al Viro <>,
	Andrew Morton <>,
	linux-security-module <>,
	linux-ima-devel <>,
	"" <>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/6] ima: provide signature based 'init' appraisal

Hi Mimi,

Thanks for reply. I will fix your comments.
I am on LinuxCon EU at the moment.
Fixing as have a time :)

- Dmitry

On 13 October 2014 19:32, Mimi Zohar <> wrote:
> On Fri, 2014-10-10 at 17:09 +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
>> Currently secure IMA/EVM initialization has to be done from the initramfs,
>> embedded in the signed kernel image. Many systems do not want to use
>> initramfs or usage of embedded initramfs makes it difficult to have
>> multi-target kernels.
>> This is a very simple patchset which makes it possible to perform secure
>> initialization by requiring initial user-space to be signed.
>> It does it by:
>> - introducing a hook to load keys
>> - loading IMA signed public key certificate into the '.ima' trusted keyring
>> - making default IMA appraisal policy to require everything to be signed
>> When builtin initramfs is not in use, keys cannot be read from initcalls,
>> because root filesystem is not yet mounted. In order to read keys before
>> executing init process, ima_prepare_keys() hook is introduced. Reading
>> public keys from the kernel is justified because signature verification
>> key is needed in order to verify anything else which is read from the
>> file system. Public keys are X509 certificates and itself signed by the
>> trusted key from the .system keyring. Kernel BIG KEYS support is an example
>> of reading keys directly by the kernel.
>> CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT kernel option is provided to make the IMA
>> default appraisal policy to required signature validation. Signed init
>> process need to initialize EVM key and load appropriate IMA policy which
>> would not require everything to be signed.
>> Unless real '/sbin/init' is signed, a simple and practical way is to place
>> all signed programs, libraries, scripts and configuration files under
>> dedicated directory, for example '/ima', and run signed init process by
>> providing a kernel command line parameter 'init=/ima/init'.
>> In the first post of these patches Andrew Morton noted that
>> integrity_read_file() is a very simple open-file-and-slurp-it-into-memory
>> and if there are other similar functions that can be made in ./lib.
>> I found out that only sound:sound_firmware.c:do_mod_firmware_load(),
>> which is enabled by CONFIG_SOUND_PRIME which is related to deprecated OSS
>> interface and is not enabled anymore in latest Ubuntu kernels, at least.
>> So I am keeping integrity_read_file() in integrity subsystem.
>> cpio based initramfs currently does not support extended attributes.
>> There is an initial agreement to introduce light-weight tar parser to
>> the kernel to support extended attributes which will make it possible to
>> use IMA appraisal with external initramfs. It will benefit from this
>> patchset and allow to update initramfs with signed files also on the
>> running system as distros do.
> Thanks, Dmitry.  The patches look good, but I still will need to test.
> (Once I figure out how to build a kernel without an initramfs, that
> boots a distro kernel.)  Only some minor suggested patch descriptions
> changes ...
> Mimi
>> Changes in v3:
>> * ima_prepare_keys() renamed to integrity_load_keys() to be the hook
>>   for both modules of integrity subsystem IMA/EVM.
>> * removed unnecessary configuration options and declared init functions
>>   with '__init'.
>> * updated to lately introduced 'ima_policy_flag' variable to disabled and
>>   enable IMA appraisal.
>> * separated key loading patch from policy change patch
>> * added patch which refactor vfs_read(). Agreed with Mimi to offer to
>>   move calling file operations hooks to a separate helper function which
>>   is then used by vfs_read() and integrity_kernel_read(). Applying this
>>   patch does not affect functionality and can be applied if agreed so.
>> Changes in v2:
>> * ima_kernel_read() moved as integrity_kernel_read() from ima_crypto.c to
>>   iint.c for use by integrity_read_file. The reason for keeping internal
>>   version is because 'integrity' version does not call fsnotify_access(),
>>   add_rchar() and inc_syscr().
>> * integrity_read_file() moved from digsig.c to iint.c because it is used
>>   by IMA crypto subsystem and should not depend on digsig support being
>>   enabled.
>> -Dmitry
>> Dmitry Kasatkin (6):
>>   integrity: provide integrity_read_file()
>>   integrity: provide x509 certificate loading from the kernel
>>   ima: load x509 certificate from the kernel
>>   integrity: provide hook to load keys when rootfs is ready
>>   ima: require signature based appraisal
>>   VFS: refactor vfs_read()
>>  fs/read_write.c                     | 24 ++++++++---
>>  include/linux/fs.h                  |  1 +
>>  include/linux/integrity.h           |  6 +++
>>  init/main.c                         |  6 ++-
>>  security/integrity/digsig.c         | 37 +++++++++++++++-
>>  security/integrity/iint.c           | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>  security/integrity/ima/Kconfig      | 22 ++++++++++
>>  security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 35 ++-------------
>>  security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c   | 17 ++++++++
>>  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c |  5 +++
>>  security/integrity/integrity.h      | 14 ++++++
>>  11 files changed, 212 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)

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