linux-kernel - [PATCH 3.16.y-ckt 093/254] evm: properly handle INTEGRITY

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Message-Id: <1416912004-5928-94-git-send-email-luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Date:	Tue, 25 Nov 2014 10:37:23 +0000
From:	Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@...onical.com>
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org,
	kernel-team@...ts.ubuntu.com
Cc:	Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@...onical.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3.16.y-ckt 093/254] evm: properly handle INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS EVM status

3.16.7-ckt2 -stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>

commit 3dcbad52cf18c3c379e96b992d22815439ebbe53 upstream.

Unless an LSM labels a file during d_instantiate(), newly created
files are not labeled with an initial security.evm xattr, until
the file closes.  EVM, before allowing a protected, security xattr
to be written, verifies the existing 'security.evm' value is good.
For newly created files without a security.evm label, this
verification prevents writing any protected, security xattrs,
until the file closes.

Following is the example when this happens:
fd = open("foo", O_CREAT | O_WRONLY, 0644);
setxattr("foo", "security.SMACK64", value, sizeof(value), 0);
close(fd);

While INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS status is handled in other places, such
as evm_inode_setattr(), it does not handle it in all cases in
evm_protect_xattr().  By limiting the use of INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS to
newly created files, we can now allow setting "protected" xattrs.

Changelog:
- limit the use of INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS to IMA identified new files

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@...sung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@...onical.com>
---
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 9f5f923f7bfd..970772c731ff 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -284,6 +284,13 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 		goto out;
 	}
 	evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
+	if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) {
+		struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+
+		iint = integrity_iint_find(dentry->d_inode);
+		if (iint && (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE))
+			return 0;
+	}
 out:
 	if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS)
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, dentry->d_inode,
-- 
2.1.0

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