linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 6/7] SELinux: The copy-up operation must have read permission on the lower file

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Message-ID: <12076.1417097856@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Date:	Thu, 27 Nov 2014 14:17:36 +0000
From:	David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To:	Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
Cc:	dhowells@...hat.com, linux-unionfs@...r.kernel.org,
	selinux@...ho.nsa.gov, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 6/7] SELinux: The copy-up operation must have read permission on the lower file

Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov> wrote:

> This means that it expects to trigger those capability checks as part of
> its subsequent actions.  Raising those capabilities temporarily in its
> credentials will pass the capability module checks but won't address the
> corresponding SELinux checks (both capability and file-based), so you'll
> end up triggering an entire set of checks against the current process'
> credentials.  This same pattern is repeated elsewhere in overlayfs.

Hmmm...  Yes.  I need to check whether the lower file can be read *before*
overriding the creds.

David
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