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Message-ID: <12173.1417098096@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2014 14:21:36 +0000
From: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To: unlisted-recipients:; (no To-header on input)
Cc: dhowells@...hat.com, Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
linux-unionfs@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...ho.nsa.gov,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 6/7] SELinux: The copy-up operation must have read permission on the lower file
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com> wrote:
> > This means that it expects to trigger those capability checks as part of
> > its subsequent actions. Raising those capabilities temporarily in its
> > credentials will pass the capability module checks but won't address the
> > corresponding SELinux checks (both capability and file-based), so you'll
> > end up triggering an entire set of checks against the current process'
> > credentials. This same pattern is repeated elsewhere in overlayfs.
>
> Hmmm... Yes. I need to check whether the lower file can be read *before*
> overriding the creds.
Actually, I think ovl_permission() does sufficient checks on the lower inode
by calling __inode_permission() upon it.
David
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