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Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2014 14:21:36 +0000 From: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com> To: unlisted-recipients:; (no To-header on input) Cc: dhowells@...hat.com, Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>, linux-unionfs@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...ho.nsa.gov, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 6/7] SELinux: The copy-up operation must have read permission on the lower file David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com> wrote: > > This means that it expects to trigger those capability checks as part of > > its subsequent actions. Raising those capabilities temporarily in its > > credentials will pass the capability module checks but won't address the > > corresponding SELinux checks (both capability and file-based), so you'll > > end up triggering an entire set of checks against the current process' > > credentials. This same pattern is repeated elsewhere in overlayfs. > > Hmmm... Yes. I need to check whether the lower file can be read *before* > overriding the creds. Actually, I think ovl_permission() does sufficient checks on the lower inode by calling __inode_permission() upon it. David -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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