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Message-ID: <20150114211613.GH2253@moon>
Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2015 00:16:13 +0300
From: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>
To: Calvin Owens <calvinowens@...com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Peter Feiner <pfeiner@...gle.com>,
Grant Likely <grant.likely@...retlab.ca>,
Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh.poyarekar@...il.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kernel-team@...com,
Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...nvz.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH] procfs: Add /proc/<pid>/mapped_files
On Wed, Jan 14, 2015 at 12:46:53PM -0800, Calvin Owens wrote:
> > >
> > > Restriction to CAP_SYSADMIN for follow_link is undertansble, but why do we
> > > restrict readdir and readlink?
> >
> > We didn't think this functionality might be needed someone but us (criu camp),
> > so that the rule of thumb was CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE + CAP_SYSADMIN, until
> > otherwise strictly needed. So I think now we can relax security rules a bit
> > and allow to readdir and such for owners.
>
> Ah, I feel silly for missing that. I'll send a patch to move map_files
> out from behind CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE and change the permissions.
Sure
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