linux-kernel - Re: [RFC][PATCH v2] procfs: Always expose /proc/<pid>/map

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Message-ID: <20150127073713.GJ651@moon>
Date:	Tue, 27 Jan 2015 10:37:13 +0300
From:	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>
To:	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc:	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
	Calvin Owens <calvinowens@...com>,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
	Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
	Peter Feiner <pfeiner@...gle.com>,
	Grant Likely <grant.likely@...retlab.ca>,
	Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh.poyarekar@...il.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, kernel-team@...com,
	Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...nvz.org>,
	Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH v2] procfs: Always expose /proc/<pid>/map_files/ and
 make it readable

On Mon, Jan 26, 2015 at 04:15:26PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> >
> > akpm3:/usr/src/25> grep -r map_files Documentation
> 
> If akpm's comments weren't clear: this needs to be fixed. Everything
> in /proc should appear in Documentation.

I'll do that.

> > The 640708a2cff7f81 changelog says:
> >
> > :     This one behaves similarly to the /proc/<pid>/fd/ one - it contains
> > :     symlinks one for each mapping with file, the name of a symlink is
> > :     "vma->vm_start-vma->vm_end", the target is the file.  Opening a symlink
> > :     results in a file that point exactly to the same inode as them vma's one.
> > :
> > :     For example the ls -l of some arbitrary /proc/<pid>/map_files/
> > :
> > :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80403000-7f8f80404000 -> /lib64/libc-2.5.so
> > :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f8061e000-7f8f80620000 -> /lib64/libselinux.so.1
> > :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80826000-7f8f80827000 -> /lib64/libacl.so.1.1.0
> > :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a2f000-7f8f80a30000 -> /lib64/librt-2.5.so
> > :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a30000-7f8f80a4c000 -> /lib64/ld-2.5.so
> 
> How is mmap offset represented in this output?

We're printing vm_area_struct:[vm_start;vm_end] only.

> > afacit this info is also available in /proc/pid/maps, so things
> > shouldn't get worse if the /proc/pid/map_files permissions are at least
> > as restrictive as the /proc/pid/maps permissions.  Is that the case?
> > (Please add to changelog).
> 
> Both maps and map_files uses ptrace_may_access (via mm_acces) with
> PTRACE_MODE_READ, so I'm happy from a info leak perspective.
> 
> Are mount namespaces handled in this output?

Could you clarify this moment, i'm not sure i get it.

> 
> > There's one other problem here: we're assuming that the map_files
> > implementation doesn't have bugs.  If it does have bugs then relaxing
> > permissions like this will create new vulnerabilities.  And the
> > map_files implementation is surprisingly complex.  Is it bug-free?
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