linux-kernel - Re: [RFC][PATCH v2] procfs: Always expose /proc/<pid>/map

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Date:	Tue, 27 Jan 2015 11:53:19 -0800
From:	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>
Cc:	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
	Calvin Owens <calvinowens@...com>,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
	Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
	Peter Feiner <pfeiner@...gle.com>,
	Grant Likely <grant.likely@...retlab.ca>,
	Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh.poyarekar@...il.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, kernel-team@...com,
	Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...nvz.org>,
	Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH v2] procfs: Always expose /proc/<pid>/map_files/ and
 make it readable

On Mon, Jan 26, 2015 at 11:37 PM, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 26, 2015 at 04:15:26PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
>> >
>> > akpm3:/usr/src/25> grep -r map_files Documentation
>>
>> If akpm's comments weren't clear: this needs to be fixed. Everything
>> in /proc should appear in Documentation.
>
> I'll do that.
>
>> > The 640708a2cff7f81 changelog says:
>> >
>> > :     This one behaves similarly to the /proc/<pid>/fd/ one - it contains
>> > :     symlinks one for each mapping with file, the name of a symlink is
>> > :     "vma->vm_start-vma->vm_end", the target is the file.  Opening a symlink
>> > :     results in a file that point exactly to the same inode as them vma's one.
>> > :
>> > :     For example the ls -l of some arbitrary /proc/<pid>/map_files/
>> > :
>> > :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80403000-7f8f80404000 -> /lib64/libc-2.5.so
>> > :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f8061e000-7f8f80620000 -> /lib64/libselinux.so.1
>> > :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80826000-7f8f80827000 -> /lib64/libacl.so.1.1.0
>> > :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a2f000-7f8f80a30000 -> /lib64/librt-2.5.so
>> > :      | lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Aug 26 06:40 7f8f80a30000-7f8f80a4c000 -> /lib64/ld-2.5.so
>>
>> How is mmap offset represented in this output?
>
> We're printing vm_area_struct:[vm_start;vm_end] only.
>
>> > afacit this info is also available in /proc/pid/maps, so things
>> > shouldn't get worse if the /proc/pid/map_files permissions are at least
>> > as restrictive as the /proc/pid/maps permissions.  Is that the case?
>> > (Please add to changelog).
>>
>> Both maps and map_files uses ptrace_may_access (via mm_acces) with
>> PTRACE_MODE_READ, so I'm happy from a info leak perspective.
>>
>> Are mount namespaces handled in this output?
>
> Could you clarify this moment, i'm not sure i get it.

I changed how I asked this question in my review of the documentation,
but it looks like these symlinks aren't "regular" symlinks (that are
up to the follower to have access to the file system path shown), but
rather they bypass VFS. As a result, I'm wondering how things like
mount namespaces might change this behavior: what is shown, the path
from the perspective of the target, or from the viewer (which may be
in separate mount namespaces).

-Kees

>
>>
>> > There's one other problem here: we're assuming that the map_files
>> > implementation doesn't have bugs.  If it does have bugs then relaxing
>> > permissions like this will create new vulnerabilities.  And the
>> > map_files implementation is surprisingly complex.  Is it bug-free?



-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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