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Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.00.1503162251400.13021@twin.jikos.cz>
Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2015 22:54:54 +0100 (CET)
From: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>
To: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@...ula.com>
cc: "gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk" <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
"keescook@...omium.org" <keescook@...omium.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"james.l.morris@...cle.com" <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
"serge@...lyn.com" <serge@...lyn.com>,
"linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
"hpa@...or.com" <hpa@...or.com>, jlee@...e.com
Subject: Re: Trusted kernel patchset
On Mon, 16 Mar 2015, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > - All suspend/resumes allow modifying the kernel. I can boot Linux
> > suspend, boot windows, modify the Linux restore image, boot Linux and
> > own the box. You would need to sign the resume image somehow I think or
> > just disable all suspend/resume
>
> I'm kind of torn on this - yes, there are deployment scenarios where
> hibernation can be used to circumvent the restrictions, but there are
> also scenarios where that can be avoided (eg, the bootloader verifies
> some state with respect to the hibernation image).
[ adding Joey to CC ]
Just for completness -- there is a way around this:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/9/14/183
The series is not really the optimal one, as Alan Stern later figured out
that symmetric cryptography is strong enough to achieve the same goal, but
I am not sure whether Joey implemented that idea already.
--
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs
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