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Message-Id: <1429630329-21748-58-git-send-email-luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Apr 2015 16:30:42 +0100
From: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@...onical.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org,
kernel-team@...ts.ubuntu.com
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...allels.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@...omium.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@...onical.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3.16.y-ckt 057/144] pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace
3.16.7-ckt10 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
commit ab676b7d6fbf4b294bf198fb27ade5b0e865c7ce upstream.
As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection,
/proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do
attacks.
This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap.
[1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html
[ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now
this is the simple model. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@...nvz.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...allels.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@...omium.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@...onical.com>
---
fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
index a6b314919d9d..5825f6d944ce 100644
--- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
+++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
@@ -1260,6 +1260,9 @@ out:
static int pagemap_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
+ /* do not disclose physical addresses: attack vector */
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
pr_warn_once("Bits 55-60 of /proc/PID/pagemap entries are about "
"to stop being page-shift some time soon. See the "
"linux/Documentation/vm/pagemap.txt for details.\n");
--
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