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Message-ID: <CAMzpN2j0oOJ7W1c3QBdMXUv5zSQHiZeb9Ynko1=JxUr=WRKZFQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2015 12:04:44 -0400
From: Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@...glemail.com>,
Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@...hat.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@...il.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...mgrid.com>,
Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86_64, asm: Work around AMD SYSRET SS descriptor
attribute issue
On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 at 11:56 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 at 8:46 AM, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de> wrote:
>> On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 at 07:57:36AM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
>>> On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 at 4:35 AM, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de> wrote:
>>> >
>>> > /*
>>> > * Change top 16 bits to be the sign-extension of 47th bit, if this
>>> > * changed %rcx, it was not canonical.
>>> > */
>>> > ALTERNATIVE "", \
>>> > "shl $(64 - (47+1)), %rcx; \
>>> > sar $(64 - (47+1)), %rcx; \
>>> > cmpq %rcx, %r11; \
>>> > jne opportunistic_sysret_failed", X86_BUG_SYSRET_CANON_RCX
>>>
>>> Guys, if we're looking at cycles for this, then don't do the "exact
>>> canonical test". and go back to just doing
>>>
>>> shr $__VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT, %rcx
>>> jnz opportunistic_sysret_failed
>>>
>>> which is much smaller.
>>
>> Right, what about the false positives:
>>
>> 17be0aec74fb ("x86/asm/entry/64: Implement better check for canonical addresses")
>>
>> ? We don't care?
>
> The false positives only matter for very strange workloads, e.g.
> vsyscall=native with old libc. If it's a measurable regression, we
> could revert it.
>
> --Andy
Another alternative is to do the canonical check in the paths that can
set user RIP with an untrusted value, ie, sigreturn and exec.
--
Brian Gerst
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