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Message-ID: <553E5F69.1020809@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2015 18:10:17 +0200
From: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@...hat.com>
To: Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
CC: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@...glemail.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@...il.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...mgrid.com>,
Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86_64, asm: Work around AMD SYSRET SS descriptor attribute
issue
On 04/27/2015 06:04 PM, Brian Gerst wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 at 11:56 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
>> On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 at 8:46 AM, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de> wrote:
>>> On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 at 07:57:36AM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
>>>> On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 at 4:35 AM, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> /*
>>>>> * Change top 16 bits to be the sign-extension of 47th bit, if this
>>>>> * changed %rcx, it was not canonical.
>>>>> */
>>>>> ALTERNATIVE "", \
>>>>> "shl $(64 - (47+1)), %rcx; \
>>>>> sar $(64 - (47+1)), %rcx; \
>>>>> cmpq %rcx, %r11; \
>>>>> jne opportunistic_sysret_failed", X86_BUG_SYSRET_CANON_RCX
>>>>
>>>> Guys, if we're looking at cycles for this, then don't do the "exact
>>>> canonical test". and go back to just doing
>>>>
>>>> shr $__VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT, %rcx
>>>> jnz opportunistic_sysret_failed
>>>>
>>>> which is much smaller.
>>>
>>> Right, what about the false positives:
>>>
>>> 17be0aec74fb ("x86/asm/entry/64: Implement better check for canonical addresses")
>>>
>>> ? We don't care?
>>
>> The false positives only matter for very strange workloads, e.g.
>> vsyscall=native with old libc. If it's a measurable regression, we
>> could revert it.
>>
>> --Andy
>
> Another alternative is to do the canonical check in the paths that can
> set user RIP with an untrusted value, ie, sigreturn and exec.
It is already done only on that path. Fast path doesn't check
RCX for canonicalness.
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