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Message-ID: <31154.1431965087@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Date: Mon, 18 May 2015 17:04:47 +0100
From: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To: mmarek@...e.cz, dwmw2@...radead.org
cc: dhowells@...hat.com,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Abelardo Ricart III <aricart@...nix.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@...il.com>, keyrings@...ux-nfs.org,
Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Should we automatically generate a module signing key at all?
Hi Michal, Dave,
Should we automatically generate a module signing key at all since that has
the possibility of accidentally overwriting a key that the builder has placed
in the tree?
Should we instead provide a script:
./scripts/generate-key
That generates a key if run and make it so that the build fails if you turn on
module signing and there's no key.
The script could then be parameterised, eg:
./scripts/generate-key -n dhowells@...hat.com -k rsa2048 -d sha256 \
-o ./my-signing-key.priv -x ./my-signing-key.x509 \
-p "correct horse battery staple"
Yes, this might throw randconfig into a strop but that can be dealt with by:
(1) Requiring anyone who runs randconfig to provide a key first just in case.
(2) Marking the CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ALL option to be ignored by randconfig - it
only applies during installation anyway.
(3) Accept that module *installation* will fail due to a lack of private key
and just handle a complete lack of X.509 certs in the source and build
dirs when assembling system_certificates.S.
David
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