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Message-ID: <20150601200013.GB2818@hopstrocity>
Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2015 14:00:13 -0600
From: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@...onical.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc: "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
Roland McGrath <roland@...k.frob.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...allels.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] seccomp: add ptrace commands for suspend/resume
On Mon, Jun 01, 2015 at 12:38:57PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 1, 2015 at 12:28 PM, Tycho Andersen
> <tycho.andersen@...onical.com> wrote:
> > This patch is the first step in enabling checkpoint/restore of processes
> > with seccomp enabled.
> >
> > One of the things CRIU does while dumping tasks is inject code into them
> > via ptrace to collect information that is only available to the process
> > itself. However, if we are in a seccomp mode where these processes are
> > prohibited from making these syscalls, then what CRIU does kills the task.
> >
> > This patch adds a new ptrace command, PTRACE_SUSPEND_SECCOMP that enables a
> > task from the init user namespace which has CAP_SYS_ADMIN to disable (and
> > re-enable) seccomp filters for another task so that they can be
> > successfully dumped (and restored).
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@...onical.com>
> > CC: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> > CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
> > CC: Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>
> > CC: Roland McGrath <roland@...k.frob.com>
> > CC: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
> > CC: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...allels.com>
> > CC: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>
> > ---
> > include/linux/seccomp.h | 8 ++++++
> > include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h | 1 +
> > kernel/ptrace.c | 10 ++++++++
> > kernel/seccomp.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> > 4 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h
> > index a19ddac..7cc870f 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/seccomp.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h
> > @@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ struct seccomp_filter;
> > struct seccomp {
> > int mode;
> > struct seccomp_filter *filter;
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
> > + bool suspended;
> > +#endif
> > };
> >
> > #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
> > @@ -53,6 +56,11 @@ static inline int seccomp_mode(struct seccomp *s)
> > return s->mode;
> > }
> >
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
> > +extern int suspend_seccomp(struct task_struct *);
> > +extern int resume_seccomp(struct task_struct *);
> > +#endif
> > +
> > #else /* CONFIG_SECCOMP */
> >
> > #include <linux/errno.h>
> > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h b/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h
> > index cf1019e..8ba4e4f 100644
> > --- a/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h
> > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h
> > @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
> > #define PTRACE_CONT 7
> > #define PTRACE_KILL 8
> > #define PTRACE_SINGLESTEP 9
> > +#define PTRACE_SUSPEND_SECCOMP 10
> >
> > #define PTRACE_ATTACH 16
> > #define PTRACE_DETACH 17
> > diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
> > index c8e0e05..a6b6527 100644
> > --- a/kernel/ptrace.c
> > +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
> > @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
> > #include <linux/highmem.h>
> > #include <linux/pagemap.h>
> > #include <linux/ptrace.h>
> > +#include <linux/seccomp.h>
> > #include <linux/security.h>
> > #include <linux/signal.h>
> > #include <linux/uio.h>
> > @@ -1003,6 +1004,15 @@ int ptrace_request(struct task_struct *child, long request,
> > break;
> > }
> > #endif
> > +
> > +#if defined(CONFIG_SECCOMP) && defined(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE)
> > + case PTRACE_SUSPEND_SECCOMP:
> > + if (data)
> > + return suspend_seccomp(child);
> > + else
> > + return resume_seccomp(child);
> > +#endif
> > +
> > default:
> > break;
> > }
> > diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
> > index 980fd26..a358a58 100644
> > --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
> > +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
> > @@ -569,6 +569,7 @@ static int mode1_syscalls_32[] = {
> > static void __secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
> > {
> > int *syscall_whitelist = mode1_syscalls;
> > +
> > #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
> > if (is_compat_task())
> > syscall_whitelist = mode1_syscalls_32;
> > @@ -590,6 +591,11 @@ void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
> > {
> > int mode = current->seccomp.mode;
> >
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
> > + if (current->seccomp.suspended)
> > + return;
> > +#endif
>
> IMO it's unfortunate that this has any runtime overhead at all. Can
> it be suspend be multiplexed into mode to avoid this?
Yes, I can make that change. Something like:
#define SECCOMP_SUSPENDED 0x8000000
and then masking it off at the appropriate places?
Tycho
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